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SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY: WHY NOW AND
WHY NOT IN THE IMF
Molly Ryan*
As the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis that began in 2009 continues to
run its course, leaving massive economic dislocation in its wake, and as
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina makes its way to the U.S.
Supreme Court, this Note discusses the timely and persistent problem of
sovereign debt crises and the many impediments to their orderly resolution.
This Note evaluates various proposals for dealing with sovereign debt–
crisis resolution and concludes that a multilateral treaty–based sovereign
bankruptcy regime, institutionally independent from the International
Monetary Fund, offers the best solution.
The status quo—messy, inefficient, and unpredictable ad hoc
negotiations—has consistently proven inadequate. Ex ante contractual
devices and piecemeal statutory fixes in domestic law offer at best
incremental solutions that can do little to alter the fundamental problems
with the present state of affairs. Just as domestic bankruptcy law
complements the law of creditor remedies due to the shortcomings of the
latter, so too should a system of international bankruptcy law complement
the law of creditor remedies vis-à-vis sovereign debtors. This Note argues
that, although this approach may be difficult to achieve, that does not
justify abandoning it.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2012, Greece executed a debt exchange and subsequent buyback that
earned the distinction of being the largest ever debt restructuring by
volume.1 The debt exchange also involved the largest ever aggregate
creditor losses.2 The restructuring included the near elimination of
Greece’s sovereign bonds held by private investors, which had a face value
of more than 100 percent of Greece’s gross domestic product (GDP).3 The
architects of the deal applauded themselves for achieving high creditor
participation (97 percent) and significant debt relief for Greece
(approximately 50 percent of the country’s GDP).4 But the same
dealmakers heralding the success of the restructuring concede that the deal
came far too late (more than two years after Greece lost access to capital
markets and long after Greece’s debt became unsustainable), created large
risks for the European official creditors involved, left money on the table
for Greek taxpayers, created a terrible precedent by paying holdout
creditors in full, and failed to restore Greece to sustainability.5 And that is
what the brokers of the global financial system consider a success?
Lack of experience with sovereign debt crises is no excuse for the
international community’s current dearth of legal and policy tools to
address the serious problems presented by situations like that in Greece.
The first recorded sovereign debt default dates back to at least the fourth
century BCE, when ten Greek municipalities in the Attic Maritime
Association defaulted on loans from the Delos Temple.6 And sovereign
debt difficulties have persisted throughout the subsequent centuries.
Charles V’s empire relied heavily on short-term and consolidated loans
with private bankers, despite earning substantial revenues from its
colonies.7 France defaulted on its debt eight times between 1500 and
1800,8 while Spain defaulted thirteen times between 1500 and 1900.9 The
Panic of 1837 led to eight U.S. states plus the Florida Territory defaulting

1. Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebecsh & Mitu Gulati, The Greek Debt
Restructuring: An Autopsy, 28 ECON. POL’Y 513, 515–16 (2013).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, REVISITING SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY 25
(2013), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/10/
sovereign%20bankruptcy/ciepr_2013_revisitingsovereignbankruptcyreport.pdf.
5. Id. at 24–26; Zettelmeyer et al., supra note 1, at 517.
6. FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND LESSONS
FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 3 (2006).
7. Juan Gelabert, Castile, 1504–1808, in THE RISE OF THE FISCAL STATE IN EUROPE, C.
1200–1815, at 206–07 (Richard Bonney ed., 1999).
8. Richard Bonney, France, 1494–1815, in THE RISE OF THE FISCAL STATE IN EUROPE,
C. 1200–1815, supra note 7, at 147–48, 162 (discussing France’s policy of persistent partial
defaults in order to maintain a serviceable level of debt during the eighteenth century).
9. Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff & Miguel A. Savastano, Debt Intolerance,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY, 2003 No. 1, at 1–2, 6.
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on bonds by the time the subsequent recession ran its course.10 And the
more than 600 individual cases of sovereign debt restructurings recorded
since World War II reveal that debt defaults and restructurings have been
prevalent both across and within countries in the modern era.11
That sovereigns will continue to utilize capital markets to finance their
expenditures is a given.12 That at some point any given sovereign will
experience a mismatch in maturities of outstanding debt obligations and
adequate currency with which to service it—whether due to domestic policy
mismanagement, exogenous shocks, or some combination of the two—
seems equally certain.13 Centuries of well-documented financial crises
would seem to clearly support these statements.14 The recent sovereign
debt crises in the Eurozone starkly illustrate that the heretofore widely held
assumption that advanced economies are immune to sovereign debt crises
in the modern era is plainly wrong.15 Yet under the current international
10. DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 502, 508 (2007).
11. Udaibir S. Das, Michael G. Papaioannou & Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign Debt
Restructurings 1950–2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts 30 (Int’l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. WP/12/203, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12203.pdf.
12. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Responsible Sovereign Lending and
Borrowing, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 64 (2010) (explaining that advanced economies
rely on borrowing to finance their budget deficits, while developing countries require it to
develop); Manuel Monteagudo, Peru’s Experience in Sovereign Debt Management and
Litigation: Some Lessons for the Legal Approach to Sovereign Indebtedness, 73 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 201, 212 (2010) (“History shows that public powers have always
demanded financial resources . . . .”). At the end of 2011, the external debt stock of the G-7
countries totaled $42.5 trillion, with an average of 26 percent owed by governments. THE
WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL DEBT STATISTICS 13 (2013). The stock of developing
countries’ external debt has continued on an upward trend, rising from $4.4 trillion in 2010
to $4.9 trillion at the end of 2011, with 51 percent of long-term debt publicly guaranteed. Id.
The general government debt of the seventeen Eurozone countries averaged 76 percent of
GDP in 2011, which is more than twice the comparable ratio for the largest borrowers
among developing countries. Id. The seventeen Eurozone countries are: Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Spain.
13. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 39–47; Das et al., supra
note 11, at 66–82.
14. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 3–29 (providing a
detailed discussion of sovereign debt crises since the nineteenth century); Das et al., supra
note 11, at 30 (noting that more than 600 sovereign debt restructurings have taken place
during the last sixty years); see also supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text. See generally
WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 118–52
(Hartley Withers ed., 14th ed. 1915) (1873) (for a classic treatment of financial panics in a
broader sense).
15. Compare LEX REIFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD HOC
MACHINERY 50–51 (2003) (asserting the then widely accepted view that “[n]one of the
mature democracies in the world have come close to a sovereign default in the Bretton
Woods era” and “a default by one of these countries on its foreign debt is almost
inconceivable”), with Euro in Crisis, FIN. TIMES, http://www.ft.com/indepth/euro-in-crisis
(last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (providing news, commentary, and analysis of the Eurozone’s
ongoing sovereign debt crises unfolding in Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, Portugal, and Spain),
and Charles Forelle, Iceland Borrows $2 Billion From IMF, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2008,
12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122486370333666973.
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legal regime, in spite of centuries of experience with the problem and the
ongoing evolution of international legal institutions, sovereign debt
restructurings are handled in a totally ad hoc manner.16 They are chaotic,
messy, unpredictable, and can drag on for many years.17 The current
regime is marked by serious shortcomings—it lacks transparency and
legitimacy, is inefficient, and applies inequitable treatment both to debtors
and creditors.18
From the vantage point of common law, debt (as the term is used herein)
is a contract.19 It is a legally enforceable promise between debtor and
creditor.20 Debt contracts derive their value from the “framework of laws
and institutions that support them.”21 Certainty, predictability, and
uniformity of result are important values in all areas of the law. But where
the parties are likely to give advance thought to the legal consequences of
their transactions, as in a contract, these values are at their apex.22
Proposals for an international legal framework that provides for creditor
remedies vis-à-vis sovereign debtors in an orderly fashion are nothing
new.23 Shortly before World War II, the League of Nations formed a
special committee that proposed the creation of the International Tribunal
for Debts, which would have had jurisdiction to adjudicate sovereign
lending contracts with international private borrowers.24 Periods of intense
intellectual debate in this area have ebbed and flowed since then,
particularly since the 1970s.25 The academic and policy community now
finds itself in another period of intense debate.26
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 55–63; Ugo Panizza,
Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt
and Default, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 651, 651 (2009).
20. See, e.g., 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1 (3d ed. 2004);
see also infra Part I.C. But see, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 55–63
(discussing limitations on the legal enforcement of sovereign debt contracts, most of which
are largely practical and political rather than legal).
21. REIFFEL, supra note 15, at 11.
22. See, e.g., Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1314 (N.Y. 1989)
(noting that contract law is “an area of the law where certainty, predictability and reliability
are highly prized common-law goals”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6
cmt. i (1971).
23. In 1776, Adam Smith wrote:
When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in the same
manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, open, and
avowed bankruptcy is always the measure which is both least dishonourable to the
debtor, and least hurtful to the creditor.
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 883 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library ed. 1937)
(1776).
24. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL
LOAN CONTRACTS 5–7 (1939); MICHAEL WAIBEL, SOVEREIGN DEFAULTS BEFORE
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 324 (2011).
25. See, e.g., Das et al., supra note 11 (providing an in-depth review of the literature
from 1950 through 2010); see also Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy
Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976–2001, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 470
(2002); Kathrin Berensmann & Angélique Herzberg, International Sovereign Insolvency
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Commentators who favor the idea of a bankruptcy regime for sovereign
debtors have invoked countless reasons—many grounded in economic,
policy, social, and moral arguments—to support their position.27
Opponents have responded with a similarly far-reaching panoply of
criticisms.28 As the discussion of the utility of a sovereign bankruptcy
mechanism has reemerged in earnest in the wake of the Eurozone sovereign
debt crisis29 and the NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina saga,30 this
Note deigns to enter the fray by elevating one central proposition: from the
perspective of contract law, a preagreed framework for the orderly
resolution of sovereign debt crises, akin to a bankruptcy mechanism, is
desirable for both debtors and creditors. Such a mechanism has the
potential to provide certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result in a
way that no other existing or proposed solution can. Just as domestic
bankruptcy law complements the law of creditor remedies due to the
shortcomings of the latter,31 so too should a system of international
bankruptcy law complement the law of creditor remedies in the realm of
sovereign debt. As Anna Gelpern aptly stated in a recent commentary, in
spite of the formidable practical obstacles to implementing a sovereign
bankruptcy regime, the role of the legal academy “is to challenge
imaginations until reality catches up.”32 This Note is informed by that
valuable insight.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of key features of sovereign
debt, sovereign debt crises, and subsequent debt workouts, including key
legal issues. Part II introduces and discusses the tools that are on the table,
whether in reality or as academic constructs, for dealing with sovereign debt
crises. These tools include ad hoc deals (currently the predominate
approach), contractual devices, national legislation, and multilateral
solutions. Part III takes the position that coordinating sovereign debt
restructurings through an orderly preagreed framework, in the form of a
multilateral treaty, would be the most satisfactory solution. Part III also
suggests the general contours of the form such a treaty mechanism should
take, and it concedes some of the key impediments to this approach,
namely, political realities.
I. SOVEREIGN DEBT IN DISTRESS:
RESTRUCTURINGS, BAILOUTS, AND BAIL-INS
This Note begins by providing context for the debate regarding sovereign
debt–crisis resolution. Part I.A sets forth a basic overview of the sovereign
Procedure—A Comparative Look at Selected Proposals? (German Dev. Inst., Discussion
Paper No. 23/2007);.
26. See infra Part II.D.1.e.
27. See infra Part II.D.1.
28. See infra Part II.D.1.
29. See supra notes 1–4, 12 and accompanying text.
30. See infra Part I.C.4.
31. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 4–19 (1986).
32. Anna Gelpern, A Skeptic’s Case for Sovereign Bankruptcy, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1095,
1096 (2013).
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debt market and explains fundamental concepts and terminology. Part I.A
also discusses the key features that distinguish sovereign debt from other
kinds of debt. Part I.B identifies the major distortions in the sovereign debt
market. Part I.C discusses various legal issues impacting sovereign debt
workouts, including legal doctrines that limit and enable the enforcement of
creditor remedies. Finally, Part I.D explains the collective action problems
involved in sovereign debt restructurings, including holdout creditors and
so-called vulture funds. The problems discussed in this Part invite an
international policy response.
A. Sovereign Debt: An Overview
This section introduces the fundamental concepts and distinguishing
features of sovereign debt in order to lay the necessary foundation for a
fuller discussion of challenges in sovereign debt markets and, ultimately,
legal solutions aimed at addressing these challenges.
1. Fundamental Concepts
“Sovereign debt,” as the term is used in this Note, refers to a debt
instrument issued by a governmental entity.33 A “debt instrument” is a
financial claim that requires one or more payments of interest or principal
by the debtor to the creditor at a date, or dates, in the future.34 The term
“sovereign debt restructuring” denotes any change in the profile of
contractual payments owed by a sovereign debtor.35 A restructuring may
simply constitute a rescheduling that involves the deferment of principal
payments due on maturing debt, without any reduction in the contractual
interest rate.36 Alternatively, a restructuring could involve both a deferment
of principal payments and a reduction in the contractual interest rate.37 A
restructuring may also involve a reduction in the face value of a country’s
debt, which is known as a “haircut.”38 A “refinancing” denotes the
conversion of the original debt, including arrears, into a new instrument.39
The term “workout” is synonymous with “restructuring” in this context.40
More formal synonyms for “restructuring” and “workout” include
33. See, e.g., RIEFFEL, supra note 15, at 9–23 (providing a useful and concise discussion
of the fundamental economic concepts underlying debt contracts); Panizza et al., supra note
19, at 659–88 (presenting a survey of the economic literature on sovereign debt).
34. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT STATISTICS: GUIDE FOR
COMPILERS AND USERS 3 (2013), available at http://www.tffs.org/pdf/method/2013/
psds2013.pdf. The following is a nonexhaustive list of debt instruments: special drawing
rights; currency and deposits; debt securities; loans; insurance; pensions; standardized
guarantee schemes; and other accounts payable. Id.
35. See, e.g., NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS? RESPONDING
TO FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS 3 n.3 (2004).
36. See, e.g., id.
37. See, e.g., id.; Das et al., supra note 11, at 82–87 (discussing the economics of
sovereign debt restructurings).
38. See, e.g., ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 3.
39. See, e.g., RIEFFEL, supra note 15, at 23.
40. Id. at 20.
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“bankruptcy” and “insolvency.”41 All of these terms denote the procedures,
both formal and informal, for resolving the settlement of creditors’
contractual claims when a borrower is unable to meet its obligations in
full.42
The following is a brief summary of the fundamental dynamic underlying
a restructuring. If creditors agree to take a haircut, reducing the excessive
debt burden of a sovereign debtor, the country may be enabled to strengthen
its economy, thereby increasing its ability to repay the remaining debt.43
Instead of absorbing a sizeable loss from a sovereign default, creditors may
benefit by restructuring debt in this manner and subsequently bearing a
smaller loss.44 But if creditors renegotiate debt too easily, future debtors
will be incentivized to default even when they can feasibly repay.45
“Bailouts” involve official sector lending in response to a sovereign debt
crisis,46 while “bail-ins” denote commitments from private sector creditors
engaging in various forms of so-called “burden sharing.”47 What is termed
the “official” or “public” sector includes the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank, regional and multilateral development banks, the
group of bilateral creditors that comprise the Paris Club, and governmental
entities (such as central banks, departments, agencies, and other
government-controlled institutions).48 The finance ministers from the
Group of Seven (G-7) countries—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the United Kingdom, and the United States—assume the primary role in
designing the policy framework for sovereign debt workouts, and the IMF
is their principal instrument for implementation.49 Other multilateral
institutions undertake a secondary role.50 The prominent role of the G-7 is
directly related to the economic dominance of these countries in the global
economy and the political clout of their heads of state.51 When a crisis
leads to an imminent or actual sovereign default, the G-7 architects
determine the amounts and forms of official support that will be deployed
to mitigate the crisis and to finance the country’s recovery.52
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of Contractual Terms
in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 134 (2012).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, International Bailouts, Moral
Hazard and Conditionality, 16 ECON. POL’Y 409 (2001); see also infra notes 53–57 and
accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 8–9 (discussing
how, in principle, creditor moral hazard can be mitigated by employing official rescue
packages that “bail-in” private creditors); ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 6, 18
(discussing different types of bailouts and bail-ins).
48. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 1 n.1; see also RIEFFEL, supra note 15, at 24–
44, 56–94 (providing a useful sketch of the main players involved in sovereign workouts,
including the official sector, and a discussion of the Paris Club process).
49. REIFFEL, supra note 15, at 24.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 24–25.
52. Id. at 26–27.

2014]

SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY

2481

Bailouts are controversial.53 The United States and other G-7 architects
often choose to provide bailouts for countries where they have strategic and
financial interests at stake.54 Absent an established international framework
for dealing with distressed sovereign debtors in an orderly fashion, the
decision by the official sector as to whether or not to provide rescue
financing to a sovereign in crisis is consequential. The economic and
financial losses resulting from an unabated crisis will often wreak havoc on
a crisis country (including bank panics, capital flight, and the loss of access
to credit markets for households and private businesses),55 and these
economic losses often spill over beyond the borders of the crisis country.56
Furthermore, policy choices for dealing with a sovereign debt crisis will
influence expectations about how other countries will act and how the
international community will respond when they find themselves in
trouble.57

53. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 8 (explaining
the idea that overborrowing on the part of sovereigns might be the result of moral hazard
linked to bailouts since creditors may have incentives to lend recklessly because official
bailout packages may enable repayments that are above the socially optimal level, with the
resulting bill footed by local taxpayers who end up repaying even when it would have been
better to restructure); Michael D. Bordo & Anna J. Schwartz, Under What Circumstances,
Past and Present, Have International Rescues of Countries in Financial Distress Been
Successful?, 18 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 683, 705–06 (1999) (concluding that since 1973,
bailouts have involved relatively large transfers of wealth “from the less wealthy to the
wealthier” and that bailouts during the 1990s have increased moral hazard, which “weakens
incentives for lenders to monitor the performance of both the private and public sectors
where they invest”); Jeanne & Zettelmeyer, supra note 46; Devesh Kapur, The IMF: A Cure
or a Curse?, FOREIGN POL’Y, Summer 1998, at 114, 125 (1998) (discussing moral hazard
experienced by the IMF due to the fact that the Fund is almost always repaid). But see
RIEFFEL, supra note 15, at 53–55 (discussing the term “bailout” in this context and why that
term may be misleading). Broadly speaking, “moral hazard” refers to situations where
actors do not fully internalize the consequences of their actions. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow,
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 961
(1963); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral
Hazard, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 4, 5 (1983).
54. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 5; Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Roadblock to a
Sovereign Bankruptcy Law, 23 CATO J. 73, 74 (2003) [hereinafter Sachs, Roadblock]
(“Managing sovereign insolvency is all politics—whose favored pupil or geopolitical ward
you are, or perhaps whose enemy you are.”); Jeffrey D. Sachs, Do We Need an International
Lender of Last Resort 2 (Apr. 20, 1995), available at http://www.earth.columbia.edu/
sitefiles/file/about/director/pubs/intllr.pdf [hereinafter Sachs, International Lender of Last
Resort] (“[A] country’s ability to secure debt relief depends much more on its pecking order
in international politics then [sic] it does on financial merit.”).
55. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 52–58; Panizza et al.,
supra note 19, at 674–82; Das et al., supra note 11, at 60–65.
56. See, e.g., ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 5; Choi et al., supra note 43, at 137
(explaining that third-party countries may by harmed by the default of a neighboring
sovereign because (1) banks and citizens in the third-party countries may own the debt and
(2) the default of one country can lead to a domino effect resulting in a regional or global
economic downturn).
57. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 5.
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2. Distinguishing Features of Sovereign Debt
Sovereign debt involves peculiarities that distinguish it from corporate
debt in at least three important ways. First, because a sovereign cannot be
liquidated and no formal bankruptcy for sovereigns exists, a country facing
a debt crisis can never get a fresh start in the way that an individual or
corporation can by undergoing an insolvency proceeding.58 Second, due to
practical and legal constraints, contract enforcement is more difficult to
achieve where the debtor is a sovereign.59 The practical reason for this is
that compelling a government to pay against its will can be difficult since
most of its assets or income (including tax revenue) that could be used for
repayment are located inside the sovereign’s territory.60 The primary legal
constraint on recovery is the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which limits
the ability of sovereigns to be sued in foreign courts absent the sovereign’s
consent.61 Sovereign immunity and other key legal characteristics of
sovereign debt are discussed more fully in Part I.C. Finally, discerning
when a sovereign is actually insolvent can be difficult.62
Notably, creditor panics are more likely to occur in the context of
international or external sovereign borrowing—as opposed to domestic
sovereign borrowing, where a treasury issues debt denominated in domestic
currency in a transaction that is governed by local law.63 International
sovereign borrowing involves a government borrowing foreign currency in
58. See, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 32, at 1098; Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 70 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 100 (2007) (discussing the impossibility of a fresh start despite
successive debt relief initiatives for poor countries). As Thomas Jackson explained in the
context of individual bankruptcy:
The principal advantage bankruptcy offers an individual lies in the benefits
associated with discharge. Unless he has violated some norm of behavior
specified in the bankruptcy laws, an individual who resorts to bankruptcy can
obtain a discharge from most of his existing debts in exchange for surrendering
either his existing nonexempt assets or . . . a portion of his future earnings.
Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393,
1393 (1986) (citations omitted).
59. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 55–56; Panizza et al.,
supra note 19, at 652–659; see also infra Part I.C.
60. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 55–56; Panizza et al.,
supra note 19, at 653.
61. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 56; Panizza et al., supra
note 19, at 653–54; see also infra Part I.C.1.
62. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 6 (“[D]ebt
crises cannot be neatly separated into excusable defaults driven by fundamentals and
inexcusable repudiations.”); Choi et al., supra note 43, at 132–33 (explaining that it can be
difficult for outside investors to tell when a country is able to repay its debts (by, for
example, raising taxes, liquidating assets, or diverting revenues from other projects), and
when a country is truly not able to repay its debts (due to shocks, including economic
downturn, natural disaster, civil war, or lack of political will to engage in painful policies
necessary to make debt service feasible)); Das et al., supra note 11, at 71 (noting that any
debt sustainability analysis involves judgment and making projections of key variables that
are inherently difficult to predict).
63. Sachs, International Lender of Last Resort, supra note 54, at 5; cf. Das et al., supra
note 11, at 52–53 (discussing the key differences between domestic and external debt
restructurings).
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international capital markets.64 Such a transaction involves foreign
currency risk for the sovereign debtor,65 while protecting creditors against,
for example, the risk of opportunistic pursuit of inflationary policies on the
part of the sovereign debtor.66 It also means that the domestic central bank
will be unable to act as a lender of last resort, since the central bank is only
able to control the money supply of domestic currency.67 Any financing the
sovereign debtor is able to obtain to service international bonds may need to
be accompanied by conditionalities on the behavior of the government, and
such conditionality may be difficult to negotiate in a timely manner.68
Thus, a solvent but illiquid sovereign borrower may find it difficult to
obtain necessary financing in international capital markets to service
outstanding debt, and may be pushed into an unnecessary default as a
result.69
3. (Un)Sustainability of Sovereign Debt
Whether a sovereign’s debt profile is sustainable is not simply a matter of
the size of a country’s debt in relation to the size of its economy.70 Other
key variables include the average interest rate payable on the debt, the
maturity dates, and the proportion denominated in foreign currency.71
Many of these factors tend to be correlated with the overall debt level.72
Countries with large debts relative to the size of their economies usually
can borrow only at high rates for short periods, and they usually must
promise investors protection from exchange rate movements in order to
attract funds (i.e., debt contracts will not be denominated in local
currency).73 The political support to pay also tends to decrease as the
amount of effort required to pay increases.74
The restructuring process begins when the debtor has insufficient foreign
exchange reserves to cover scheduled external debt service payments and
payments for essential imports.75 The legal effect of directing public and
private sector borrowers within a country to suspend payments of principal
64. Sachs, International Lender of Last Resort, supra note 54, at 5.
65. See, e.g., Das et al., supra note 11, at 52–53 (noting that exchange rate
considerations and currency mismatches play a lesser role in domestic debt).
66. Choi et al., supra note 43, at 149 (“If a country borrows in its own currency, and
then devalues that currency, then the burden of repayment and the value of the debt are
reduced.”).
67. Sachs, International Lender of Last Resort, supra note 54, at 5.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 20 n.24.
71. Id. Emerging market countries tend to issue long-term debt in foreign currency and
short-term debt in both domestic and foreign currency, while advanced countries mostly
issue long-term debt in domestic currency. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at
36. The debt structures of emerging market countries contribute to debt crises. Id.
72. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 20 n.24.
73. Id.; see also supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
74. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 20 n.24.
75. Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph Reisner, The Effect of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Process on Inter-creditor Relationships, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 493, 515.
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or interest on their external borrowings (i.e., an announced general
moratorium on debt service) is to compel those borrowers to default76 under
their separate credit instruments.77 The key legal consequence of a debt
default is that it empowers individual creditors to pursue remedies against
the borrower(s).78
B. Distortions and Failures in Sovereign Debt Markets
This section identifies and discusses important distortions and failures in
sovereign debt markets that provide some of the primary justifications for a
policy response. Part I.B.1 discusses key explanations for countries’
propensity to overborrow. Part I.B.2 discusses problems associated with
sovereigns restructuring too late, and Part I.B.3 discusses problems
resulting from restructuring too little.
1. The Overborrowing Problem
Traditional theories of sovereign debt hold that the costs associated with
a default limit the ability of a sovereign to borrow.79 These models tend to
illustrate “underborrowing,” that is, borrowing at a level that is
“suboptimally low from a social perspective.”80 But this view seems to be
inconsistent with actual sovereign borrowing observed across countries and
over time.81 Advanced economies tend to have higher debt levels than
emerging market countries, but variations of borrowing levels among
countries grouped by economic development are so significant that it is
highly unlikely that most of the these countries’ debt levels are at or
approaching their upper limit.82 Similarly, dramatic swings in the
borrowing level of some countries observed during short periods of time are
not likely to result from changes in borrowing constraints.83 It is more
likely that countries borrow below their debt limit most of the time and that
changes in debt levels are attributable to policy choices and economic
shocks.84 If most countries’ debt levels are attributable to policy choices
over time, it is possible (and perhaps likely) that many countries are
overborrowing.85
Overborrowing may be the result of three key distortions. First, political
leaders frequently have incentives to borrow above socially optimal
76. A simple definition of default is “any failure to meet the contractually stated
servicing obligations on time and in full.” Herschel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck,
Sovereign Debt As a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation, 78
AM. ECON. REV. 1088 n.1 (1988).
77. Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 75, at 515.
78. Id. at 503.
79. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 7;
STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 48.
80. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 7.
81. Id.; see also Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 668–70.
82. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 7–8.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.; see also Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 666–67.
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levels.86 Second, overborrowing may be linked to moral hazard resulting
from bailout packages and other forms of official sector support.87 The
presence of bailout packages may induce creditors to lend at reckless levels
since official bailout packages enable repayment that is beyond a socially
optimal level.88 The taxpayers of the debtor country pay the price for this
overpayment because debtor countries tend to repay what they borrow from
official lenders.89 Third, overborrowing may result from the absence of
seniority rules for sovereign debtors because new lending dilutes the claims
of existing creditors.90 Debt dilution can enable excessive debt accrual
because the marginal interest rate does not reflect the increased risk
presented by the issuance of new debt.91
It may very well be that “[d]istorted incentives . . . drive a wedge
between the maximum that a sovereign can borrow—the borrowing limit—
and what it should be borrowing—the socially optimal amount of
borrowing.”92 If this is indeed the case, there may not be a social cost
associated with reducing the costs of crises.93 To the extent making debt
restructurings easier leads to increased borrowing costs, the higher cost of
capital would actually improve overall welfare for countries that
“overborrow” above the socially optimal amount.94 Furthermore, while
overborrowing is clearly problematic once sovereign debt levels become
unsustainable, empirical studies indicate that public sector borrowing may
have a “crowding out” effect on private sector borrowing and other
productive investments.95
86. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 8; see also BARRY
EICHENGREEN ET AL., INT’L CTR. FOR MONETARY AND BANKING STUD., PUBLIC DEBTS: NUTS,
BOLTS AND WORRIES 15–17 (2011).
87. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 22; see also Hal
S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors?, 37 INT’L LAW. 103 (2003)
(summarizing key arguments regarding bailouts and moral hazard and resulting market
discipline problems); Jeanne & Zettelmeyer, supra note 46, at 411–12 (emphasizing the
problem of bailouts creating moral hazard that facilitates bad domestic policies at the
expense of domestic taxpayers); supra notes 47–54 and accompanying text.
88. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 8; Jeanne & Zettelmeyer,
supra note 46, at 411–12.
89. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 8; Jeanne & Zettelmeyer,
supra note 46, at 410–11.
90. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 9; Patrick Bolton &
Olivier Jeanne, Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of a Bankruptcy
Regime, 115 J. POL. ECON. 901, 913–18 (2007).
91. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 9; Bolton & Jeanne,
supra note 90, at 412.
92. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 6.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 6; Reinhart et al., supra note 9, at 5. This argument directly counters
objections to a formalized sovereign bankruptcy mechanism based on the idea that such a
policy response would subsequently increase capital costs. See infra notes 332–36, 395 and
accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Fernando Broner et al., Sovereign Debt Markets in Turbulent Times:
Creditor Discrimination and Crowding-Out Effects 20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 19676, 2013) (showing that the increased probability of default raises
spreads on sovereign debt, thereby providing incentives for domestic creditors to purchase
sovereign debt and creating inefficient “crowding-out regions”); Şenay Ağca & Oya
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Furthermore, an overindebted sovereign may be unable to attract
voluntary new lending for productive investment since any new borrowing
will have to be used to pay off existing debt.96 According to Paul
Krugman, if a country is unable to meet its debt service obligations,
creditors have two choices: (1) they can finance the country, lending at an
expected loss with the hope that the sovereign will eventually be able to
repay its debt; or (2) they can forgive existing obligations, reducing the
sovereign’s debt level to one that the country can repay.97 Under the first
option, if the sovereign turns out to do relatively well, creditors will not
have written down their claim unnecessarily.98 But the burden of debt
distorts the sovereign’s incentives, since the creditors, rather than the
sovereign itself, mainly realize the benefits of good economic
performance.99
2. The Restructuring-Too-Late Problem
Some commentators emphasize the risk that a sovereign debtor may
default on a debt obligation simply because it is unwilling to make the
required payments, and not because it cannot make such payments.100
Others, however, emphasize the deterrent effect resulting from the fact that
a default typically leads to a major loss of confidence in all of the country’s
other financial assets, including the sovereign’s local debt and currency,
which in turn is likely to trigger a severe loss in output following a
default.101 Furthermore, legal and reputational costs have deterrent effects
Celasun, How Does Public External Debt Affect Corporate Borrowing Costs in Emerging
Markets? (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/09/266, 2009) (finding that an
increase in the external debt of emerging market governments significantly raises the
borrowing costs of the domestic corporate sector); M. Shahe Emran & Subika Farazi, Lazy
Banks? Government Borrowing and Private Credit in Developing Countries 15 (Inst. for
Int’l Econ. Policy, Working Paper No. IIEP-WP-2009-9, 2009) (utilizing panel data from
sixty developing countries to estimate that a $1 increase in government borrowing reduces
private credit by about $1.40).
96. Paul Krugman, Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang, 29 J. DEV. ECON. 253,
254 (1988); see also Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasisovereign Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 888, 926–30 (2012).
97. Krugman, supra note 96, at 254, 267.
98. Id. at 254.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 96–97; Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M.
Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring,
53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1048–51 (2004) (explaining why political factors unique to sovereign
debtors may contribute to an opportunistic default); Hal S. Scott, Sovereign Debt Default:
Cry for the United States, Not Argentina 1 (Wash. Legal Found., Working Paper Series No.
140, 2006) (arguing that “[t]he root of the sovereign debt problem is that sovereigns
overborrow . . . in excess of their institutional capacity to efficiently employ the borrowed
capital” and that such “[o]verborrowing results from the fact that sovereigns face few
consequences as a result of default”).
101. See, e.g., ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 27; STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER,
supra note 6, at 49–52 (providing a useful discussion of the empirical evidence of default
costs); Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, The Costs of Sovereign Default, 56 IMF STAFF
PAPERS 683, 690–97 (2009); Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 667–71, 674–88 (surveying the
economic literature on sovereign debt defaults and subsequent costs).
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on the possibility of sovereign default.102 And policymakers may delay
default due to self-interest and short political horizons.103
In fact, the weight of the evidence seems to indicate that policymakers’
reluctance to restructure their debts leads to suboptimal postponement of
inevitable defaults.104
In turn, delayed defaults are costly to the
international financial system.105 Delayed defaults lead to the loss of value
since a prolonged period prior to an anticipated default or crisis may lessen
a country’s capacity and willingness to pay.106 Capacity to pay is reduced
because the delay prolongs uncertainty, high interest rates, and restrictive
fiscal policies that deepen output contractions.107 Willingness to pay is
reduced because after suffering through lengthy periods of economic
austerity, constituents are less likely to support a debt restructuring on
creditor-friendly terms.108 When the restructuring does finally take place,
residual creditors will recover less of their investment than they might have
otherwise, because a smaller group of creditors will have to absorb the
burden.109
3. The Restructuring-Too-Little Problem
When debt restructurings do occur, all too often they fail to restore the
sovereign to debt sustainability and market access, which in turn leads to
unnecessary costs and repeated restructurings.110 The current system of ad
hoc sovereign debt restructurings may produce two bad equilibria.111 In the
first, restructurings are creditor-friendly and have the advantage of being
negotiated quickly, but the disadvantage of failing to solve the debt
sustainability problem.112 In the second equilibrium, sovereigns can
achieve greater debt relief, but the trade-off is lengthy negotiations and

102. See, e.g., Borensztein & Panizza, supra note 101, at 697–707.
103. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 10; Borensztein
& Panizza, supra note 101, at 716–22.
104. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 10; INT’L
MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING—RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 15–27 (2013); Borensztein
& Panizza, supra note 101, at 716–22; Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Ugo Panizza, The Elusive
Costs of Sovereign Defaults, 94 J. DEV. ECON. 95, 103–04 (2011).
105. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 104, at 20.
106. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 10; INT’L
MONETARY FUND, supra note 104, at 20.
107. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 10; INT’L
MONETARY FUND, supra note 104, at 20.
108. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 10.
109. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 104, at 20.
110. Id. at 24–25 (acknowledging this phenomenon and the IMF’s own role in
contributing to it through overly optimistic assessments and forecasts of debt sustainability);
see also infra note 217.
111. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 11; Andrew Powell,
Bipolar Debt Restructuring: Lessons from LAC, VOX LACEA (Feb. 24, 2011),
http://vox.lacea.org/?q=node/61.
112. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 11; Powell, supra note
111.
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prolonged litigation.113 “Myopic policymakers” may exacerbate these
problems if they prioritize regaining access to capital markets quickly and
thus push for implementation of swift, creditor-friendly restructurings,
leaving others to deal with the costs of future defaults.114
C. Limitations on Enforcement of Creditor Remedies
and Other Legal Issues
As mentioned above in Part I.A.2, the ability of creditors to enforce
claims against sovereign debtors is more limited than in the corporate debt
context.115 Much of the academic literature on sovereign debt emphasizes
this fact and assumes that creditors have little or no legal recourse against
defaulting sovereigns116 and that the sovereign debt market only works at
all because of various nonlegal mechanisms (including reputational
concerns and political pressures).117 But several high profile cases
demonstrate that legal enforcement of sovereign debt obligations is indeed
possible.118 This section outlines the key legal doctrines limiting
enforcement of creditor claims against sovereign borrowers, which are
sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine, and international comity.
This section concludes by discussing pari passu clause interpretation,
which, conversely, enables creditors to recover against sovereign
borrowers.
1. Sovereign Immunity
The principle of absolute sovereign immunity traditionally protected
sovereigns from suit in foreign courts absent their consent.119 Following
World War II and against the backdrop of the Cold War, the United States
began to adopt a more restrictive view of sovereign immunity because it
disliked the idea of conferring sovereign immunity to Soviet Union stateowned enterprises conducting business in the United States.120 This
restrictive view was embraced in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (FSIA), which provides that a sovereign is not immune from
jurisdiction in suits arising from acts that the sovereign performs in

113. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 11; Powell, supra note
111.
114. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 12.
115. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Blackman & Rahul Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign
Debt Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
47, 48 (2010) (arguing that foreign sovereign immunity rules function “as a rough,
sometimes inadequate, proxy for insolvency laws”).
117. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
118. See infra Part I.C.4; infra notes 185–97 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 56; Panizza et al., supra
note 19, at 653.
120. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 56; Panizza et al., supra note 19, at
653.
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connection with commercial activity.121 The United Kingdom adopted a
similar law in 1978, and many other jurisdictions have done the same.122
In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,123 the U.S. Supreme Court
determined that the issuance of debt in the United States by a sovereign fell
squarely within the ambit of the FSIA because such a transaction met all of
the Act’s required elements.124 Thus under U.S. law, international bonds
issued by a sovereign and any subsequent default are generally considered
commercial activities under the FSIA, regardless of the purpose of the issue
or the reason for the default.125 Furthermore, any remaining protections for
sovereigns under U.S. law can be waived contractually (and routinely are),
which is also the case in many other jurisdictions.126 Therefore, sovereign
immunity no longer protects sovereign issuers from being haled into courts
in the United States and elsewhere by creditors.127
However, sovereign immunity remains important in attachment
proceedings.128 Most of a sovereign’s assets located outside of its territory,
such as military or diplomatic property, do not fall within the commercial
exception to sovereign immunity.129 Furthermore, under the FSIA and
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006). The relevant language from the statute provides:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case—
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity [and]
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and
that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
122. Lee C. Buchheit, Sovereign Immunity, 7 BUS. L. REV. 63, 64 (1986); Lee C.
Buchheit, The Sovereign Client, 48 J. INT’L AFF. 527, 529 (1995).
123. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
124. Id. at 617–20 (holding that (1) the issuance of bonds was a “commercial activity”
under the FSIA; (2) the unilateral rescheduling of the bond payments had a “direct effect” in
the United States, the designated place of performance for Argentina’s contractual
obligations; and (3) Argentina’s issuance of negotiable debt instruments denominated in U.S.
dollars and payable in New York, and its appointment of a financial agent in New York, was
sufficient purposeful availment to satisfy due process minimum contacts requirements).
125. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 56–57; Panizza et al., supra note
19, at 654.
126. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 57; Panizza et al., supra note 19, at
654.
127. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 57; Panizza et al., supra note 19, at
654.
128. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1)–(2) (2006). The Second Circuit has explained:
[T]he execution immunity afforded sovereign property is broader than the
jurisdictional immunity afforded the sovereign itself. For example, while a foreign
state is not immune from suit for its commercial activities . . . a plaintiff who
prevails against the sovereign in such actions can generally execute the judgment
only upon assets with respect to which the foreign state has waived immunity, or
that the foreign state used for the commercial activity upon which the claim was
based.
Walters v. Indus. & Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 2011)
(citations omitted); see also STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 57; Panizza et
al., supra note 19, at 654.
129. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 57.

2490

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

similar laws, central bank assets are typically immune from attachment.130
And a sovereign can attempt to impede access to attachable assets by
positioning them beyond the reach of foreign courts.131 For example,
sovereigns have held their assets with the Bank for International
Settlements in Switzerland, which provides legal protections against
attachment proceedings.132
2. Act of State
Another potential limitation on creditor recovery from sovereign debtors
is the act of state doctrine, which prevents U.S. courts from judging the
validity of a foreign sovereign’s acts performed within its own territory.133
The act of state doctrine, unlike sovereign immunity, is not jurisdictional.
Instead, it confers presumptive validity on the acts of foreign sovereigns
within their territories by rendering nonjusticiable claims that challenge
such acts.134 Furthermore, the act of state doctrine cannot be waived.135
However, U.S. courts have declined to find that the act of state doctrine
protects sovereign debtors from creditor actions for recovery.136 In the
leading case Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de
Cartago,137 the Second Circuit held that the act of state doctrine would only
be applicable to that suit if the situs of the property in question was in Costa
Rica.138 The court was considering a collection action brought by a creditor
bank syndicate to recover on promissory notes issued by Costa Rican banks

130. Id.; Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 654.
131. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 57; Panizza et al., supra note 19, at
654.
132. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 57; Panizza et al., supra note 19, at
654.
133. The classic American statement of the act of state doctrine is found in Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897):
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of the government of another done within its own territory.
The modern statement of the act of state doctrine is articulated in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964):
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within
its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by this
country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous
agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that
the taking violates customary international law.
See also Phillip J. Power, Note, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and Its
Implications for Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701, 2732–38 (1996).
134. Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir.
1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 428 cmt. e (1987).
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 443 cmt. c (“Since the act of
state doctrine is a judicial policy of self-restraint, the application of the doctrine cannot be
‘waived’ by the foreign state.”); see also Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State
Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 345 (1986); Power, supra note 133, at 2732.
136. Power, supra note 133, at 2734–38.
137. 757 F.2d 516.
138. Id. at 521.
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directly controlled by the Central Bank of Costa Rica.139 The notes were
payable in U.S. dollars in New York City.140 The court concluded that the
situs of the property was the United States, and thus the act of state doctrine
was not applicable.141 Because sovereign debt contracts in default often
provide for repayment in a foreign currency and consent to foreign
jurisdiction,142 the Second Circuit’s decision in Allied Bank implies that
essentially any action to collect debts under these types of agreements in a
U.S. court will not be barred under the act of state doctrine.143
3. Comity
Comity is the recognition a sovereign grants within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another sovereign.144 Unlike
sovereign immunity or the act of state doctrine, comity “is not a rule of law,
but one of practice, convenience, and expediency. . . . [I]t is a nation’s
expression of understanding which demonstrates due regard both to
international duty and convenience and to the rights of persons protected by
its own laws.”145 In the context of creditor actions against sovereign
debtors, international comity allows a U.S. court to respect the actions of a
foreign sovereign to the extent “they are consistent with law and policy of
the United States.”146 Unlike the act of state doctrine, which applies only to
foreign acts outside of U.S. territory, comity may apply even to acts of
foreign governments on U.S. soil.147 Thus sovereign debtors have invoked
comity as an alternative defense from the act of state doctrine.148
Reviewing courts must then determine whether the default in question is
consistent with U.S. policy.149 However, courts have declined to extend
139. Id. at 518.
140. Id. at 518–19.
141. Id. at 521–22 (reasoning that (1) the purported taking in question did not come to
complete fruition in Costa Rica since the Costa Rican banks’ obligation was to pay Allied,
the designated bank syndicate, in New York and (2) that New York was also the situs under
interest analysis).
142. See supra notes 64–68, 73 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 58; Christopher C.
Wheeler & Amir Attaran, Declawing the Vulture Funds: Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense
in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 253, 266–67 (2003); Power, supra note
133, at 2737–38.
144. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895).
145. Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971); see
also Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 143, at 266–67; Power, supra note 133, at 2738.
146. Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 522 (citing United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332–33
(1937)) (finding that acts of foreign governments having extraterritorial effect—and
consequently falling outside the scope of the act of state doctrine—should nevertheless be
extended comity to the extent that “they are consistent with the law and policy of the United
States”); Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 895 F. Supp. 660, 664
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 109 F.3d 850 (2d Cir. 1997).
147. Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 522; Pravin Banker, 895 F. Supp. at 664 & n.4.
148. See, e.g., Pravin Banker, 895 F. Supp. at 664 & n.4.
149. In Allied Bank, for example, the Second Circuit initially found for the defendant
Costa Rican banks on comity grounds because it concluded that Costa Rica’s exchange
controls were fully consistent with the law and policy of the United States. Allied Bank, 757
F.2d at 519. On rehearing, the U.S. Department of Justice joined the litigation as amicus
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comity to defaulting sovereigns imposing
experiencing domestic economic crisis.150

exchange

controls

or

4. Pari Passu Clause Interpretation
While sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine, and comity have not
proven to be particularly effective defenses in actions to recover on
defaulting sovereign debt, the ratable payment interpretation of the pari
passu clause151 in the recent Second Circuit decision NML Capital, Ltd. v.
Republic of Argentina152 further empowers creditors to recover against
defaulting sovereigns.153 In 2001, Argentina defaulted on more than $80
billion in external debt, then the largest sovereign debt default in history.154
Argentina subsequently initiated an exchange offer allowing bondholders to
exchange their defaulted bonds for new unsecured and unsubordinated
curiae and clarified its position that Costa Rica’s attempted unilateral restructuring of private
obligations was inconsistent with U.S. policy. Id.
150. See, e.g., Lightwater Corp. Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 02 CIV. 3804, 2003 WL
1878420, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2003) (rejecting the argument that international law
would bar plaintiffs from suing on bonds at a time when the issuer, the Republic of
Argentina, was having a severe economic crisis); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v.
People’s Republic of the Congo, 729 F. Supp. 936, 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that the
court was “mindful of the fact that enforcement of this default judgment is likely to cause
financial difficulties for the Congo,” but the court was “not the appropriate government
institution to weigh the harm to the Congo of paying a valid judgment, against the harm to
[plaintiff] that would flow from its being denied its legal right to enforcement of the
judgment”); A.I. Credit Corp. v. Gov’t of Jam., 666 F. Supp. 629, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(recognizing the court had been advised that its holding could have a “devastating financial
impact on the Government of Jamaica” but concluding that “it is not the function of a federal
district court . . . to evaluate the consequences to the debtor of its inability to pay nor the
foreign policy or other repercussions of Jamaica’s default”); see also Power, supra note 133,
at 2738–42.
151. The Latin phrase pari passu means “by equal step” or “[p]roportionally.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (9th ed. 2009). Pari passu clauses are a standard term contained in
most cross-border lending agreements that memorialize a “borrower’s promise to ensure that
the obligation will always rank equally in right of payment with all of the borrower’s other
unsubordinated debts.” Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in
Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869, 870 (2004); see also Blackman & Mukhi,
supra note 116, at 55–57; Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Understanding the Pari Passu Clause
in Sovereign Debt Instruments: A Complex Quest, 43 INT’L LAW. 1217, 1226–27 (2009).
152. 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, No. 12-842 (Jan. 10, 2014) (granting
certiorari on the question of the permissible scope of postjudgment discovery), petition for
cert. filed, No. 13-990 (Feb. 18, 2014) (petitioning for certiorari again following a denial of
rehearing by the Second Circuit and posing the questions of (1) whether a court may enter an
injunction that effectively forces a sovereign to pay money damages with assets that are
immune from attachment under the FSIA and (2) whether the “Court should certify to the
New York Court of Appeals [the question of w]hether a foreign sovereign is in breach of a
pari passu clause when it makes periodic interest payments on performing debt without also
paying on its defaulted debt”).
153. See W. M. C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Debt After NML v. Argentina, 8 CAP.
MARKETS L.J. 123, 126–29 (2013); Romain Zamour, Note, NML v. Argentina and the
Ratable Payment Interpretation of the Pari Passu Clause, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 55, 56
(2013), http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-38-zamour-nml-v-argentina.pdf.
154. CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 10, 12 (2009); Argentina’s Debt Default: Gauchos and
Gadflies, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2011, at 91.
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external debt at a rate of twenty-five to twenty-nine cents on the dollar.155
Approximately three-quarters of the bondholders took part in a debt
exchange in 2005.156 Another debt exchange under similar terms took
place in 2010, bringing the participation rate up to 91 percent.157 Hedge
funds specializing in trading distressed sovereign debt, such as Elliott
Associates,158 purchased large amounts of Argentine debt at a significant
discount on the secondary market, refused to join the restructurings, and
sought full collection of their debt.159
In February 2012, Judge Thomas Griesa of the Southern District of New
York issued orders enjoining Argentina from making payments on its
restructured 2005 and 2010 debt without making ratable payments to NML
Capital, a hedge fund affiliated with Elliott Associates.160 A unanimous
panel of the Second Circuit substantially affirmed the district court’s order
in October 2012.161 The effect of this order was that Argentina was
prohibited from making full payment on its restructured debt without also
making full payment to the holdout plaintiffs. This interpretation of the pari
passu clause, known as the ratable payment interpretation, means that not
only must equally ranking debt be paid equally when the debtor promises in
a pari passu clause to maintain the equal ranking, but also that if there is not
enough money to pay all equally ranking creditors in full, each holder of
equally ranking debt must receive a ratable share.162 And these principles
are enforceable by a court-ordered injunction against both the debtor and
the recipients of nonratable payments.163
According to many observers, Judge Griesa’s adoption of the ratable
payment interpretation of the pari passu clause is highly problematic and
does not comport with market participants’ expectations.164 When the

155. NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 252.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 252–53.
158. See infra notes 180–84 and accompanying text.
159. Argentina’s Debt Default, supra note 154; see also infra Part I.D.2.
160. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., No. 08Civ.6978 (TPG), 09Civ.1707 (TPG),
09Civ.1708 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012).
161. NML Capital, 699 F.3d 246.
162. Buchheit & Pam, supra note 151, at 877–83.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Weidemaier, supra note 153, at 126–29; G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N.
Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 BUS. LAW. 635, 639–50 (2001). According to Lee Buchheit and
Jeremiah Pam:
[E]qually-ranking debts must be paid equally—that’s the theory. By the debtor[’s]
openly announcing its agreement (in a registration statement filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, for example) to maintain the equal ranking
of this bond with other debts, have those other creditors been given the power to
enjoin a payment under this bond, regardless of whether the instruments
evidencing those other debts contain their own pari passu covenants?
And if there is even the remotest possibility of this outcome, why would the
purchasers of such a bond agree up front to decline to accept payments under their
instrument unless every other equally-ranking lender to that borrower was also
being paid in full? Analyzed in this way, a pari passu covenant is a positively
dangerous clause to include in any debt instrument.
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Second Circuit affirmed Judge Griesa’s orders, many commentators
vociferously criticized the decision and announced the end of sovereign
debt restructuring.165 Resumption of payment only to restructured
bondholders is central to any sovereign debt restructuring, and the ratable
payment interpretation of the pari passu clause makes this selective
resumption of payment impossible.166 The decision, if left intact by the
Supreme Court, would effectively end consensual sovereign debt
restructuring because it would incentivize holding out for full repayment167
and exasperate collective action problems.
D. Collective Action Problems
Developments and innovation in capital markets during recent decades
have diversified risk associated with holding sovereign debt while
exacerbating collective action difficulties. This section discusses problems
arising from coordinating diffuse creditors in a sovereign debt restructuring.
Part I.D.1 discusses the characteristics of creditors holding sovereign debt,
and Part I.D.2 addresses holdout litigation and vulture funds.
1. Dispersion and Heterogeneity of Creditors
Since the mid-1990s, holders of sovereign debt instruments have
predominantly been widely dispersed bondholders with diverse institutional
characteristics—sophisticated hedge funds, pension funds, individual retail
investors, and everything in between.168 For example, the Argentine bonds
restructured in 2005169 were held by a particularly fragmented group of
creditors: institutional investors held 56.5 percent of restructured bonds,
and retail investors held 43.5 percent.170 The creditor group was also
dispersed geographically:
38.4 percent of the bonds were held
domestically, 15.6 percent in Italy, 10.3 percent in Switzerland, 9.1 percent
Buchheit & Pam, supra note 151, at 886. Monteagudo argues that this interpretation of the
pari passu clause
would make impossible the continuity of financial operations of a debtor breaching
a contract . . . and would render unnecessary the mere existence of bankruptcy-law
principles [since a]ccording to those principles, under a debtor’s petition, the State
prohibits any individual creditor’s recovery outside of an orderly and proportional
payment to all creditors.
Monteagudo, supra note 12, at 210.
165. See, e.g., Weidemaier, supra note 153, at 131; Zamour, supra note 153.
166. See, e.g., Weidemaier, supra note 153, at 131.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., REIFFEL, supra note 15, at 190–93; Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 671;
Das et al., supra note 11, at 21–22. Prior to the creation of the secondary debt market during
the late 1980s, the vast majority of holders of distressed debt were banks, which had an
incentive not to declare a borrower in default because they would then be required to write
down their loans. See, e.g., Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 655–56. This situation began to
change in the late 1980s with the creation of a secondary market in securitized loans, id., and
with the implementation of the Brady Plan, which involved exchanging bank loans into
sovereign bonds. See, e.g., Das et al., supra note 11, at 18.
169. See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text.
170. Das et al., supra note 11, at 24.
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in the United States, 5.1 percent in Germany, and 3.1 percent in Japan.171
The 43.5 percent retail investor group was comprised of more than 600,000
individuals (450,000 Italians, 35,000 Japanese, and 150,000 Germans and
Central Europeans).172 However, sovereign creditor structures are not
always as fragmented as Argentina’s. For example, in 2007, Belize
restructured debt owed to a concentrated creditor group involving mostly
institutional investors from the region.173 During the Belize restructuring, a
creditor committee was formed and was composed of thirteen financial
institutions from the Caribbean, representing more than 50 percent of
outstanding debt.174
Multicreditor debt instruments, such as bonds and syndicated bank loans,
are legal arrangements that present archetypal common pool problems when
an issuer runs into financial difficulties.175 Once an issuer’s financial
problems emerge, the actions of any one bondholder can significantly
impact the interests of all the other creditors.176 For example, if each holder
has absolute discretion to accelerate its bonds following an event of default,
to commence an action for debt collection and attach the borrower’s assets,
or to force a foreclosure on collateral, then the other bondholders may find
that their own options are significantly diminished.177 Thus, as observable
financial strains on the bond issuer appear, grabbing a borrower’s assets
ahead of fellow bondholders may be a sound business decision because
usually little will remain for the slowest acting creditor.178 This dynamic is
especially pronounced in the context of a sovereign debt crisis because no
formal bankruptcy regime exists to provide for a predictable, orderly, and
timely restructuring based on a preagreed equitable framework.
2. Holdout Creditors and Vulture Funds
Because participation in a sovereign debt restructuring is voluntary,
creditors may “hold out” instead of participating in an effort to obtain better
repayment terms or even the full value of their claims.179 During the late
1980s and early 1990s, a secondary market for distressed sovereign debt
developed as banks sold rescheduled sovereign debt at a significantly
discounted price in order to get it off their balance sheets.180 This
secondary market attracted investors known as “vulture creditors” or
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective
Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1320 (2002).
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. Id.; see also infra notes 302–04 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., Fisch & Gentile, supra note 100, at 1045; Panizza et al., supra note 19, at
656.
180. See, e.g., Ronald J. Silverman & Mark W. Deveno, Distressed Sovereign Debt: A
Creditor’s Perspective, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 179, 185 (2003); see also Lee C.
Buchheit, The Capitalization of Sovereign Debt: An Introduction, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 401,
402.
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“vulture funds”181 that specialize in the strategic purchase of sovereign debt
trading at a deep discount as a result of the sovereign’s financial distress.182
Vulture creditors may “free ride” by holding out during a restructuring for
better terms than those already agreed to by other creditors, or they may
attempt to sell their claims to other creditors eager to complete the
restructuring.183 If this strategy is unsuccessful, a vulture creditor may seek
to collect the full face value of its claim from the sovereign through
“holdout” litigation.184
One of the most commonly cited examples of successful holdout
litigation is the suit brought by Elliott Associates, L.P. (Elliott), a vulture
fund, against Peru.185 Elliott paid approximately $11 million on the
secondary market for letter agreements with a face value of approximately
$20 million, issued by Banco de la Nación and Banco Popular del Peru, and
guaranteed by Peru.186 At the time, Peru was in the process of negotiating a
restructuring of its debt.187 Elliott refused to participate in the restructuring
and was ultimately awarded more than $55 million.188 While holdout
creditors often face difficulties successfully enforcing judgments against
sovereign debtors,189 in this case, the Brussels Court of Appeal authorized
its execution through an order to block any payment in favor of Brady-bond
creditors.190 Peru subsequently settled for $56.3 million rather than
continuing the legal battle or risk defaulting on its other debt.191
Besides haling sovereign governments into court and requiring them to
expend resources on costly litigation, the aggressive collection strategies of
vulture fund creditors in some instances have at least temporarily impeded
sovereign debtors’ ability to carry out fundamental governmental functions.
On October 2, 2012, the Ghanaian Commercial Court granted NML Capital
an injunction to prevent the ARA Libertad, an Argentine Navy cadettraining ship, and its crew from leaving the Ghanaian port of Tema until
Argentina honored U.S. judgments awarding NML Capital approximately
$1.6 billion.192 Following a two-month standoff, on December 15, 2012,
181. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, The Vulture Game, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1992, § 6
(Magazine), at 18 (explaining that the term “vulture” comes from the analogy that these
investors “get rich by feeding on the carcasses” of insolvent debtors).
182. See, e.g., Fisch & Gentile, supra note 100, at 1088.
183. Id.
184. Id.; see also supra Part I.C.4. For useful discussions of many key holdout litigation
cases, see STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 62–76, and Panizza et al., supra
note 19, at 655–59.
185. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nación, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999).
186. Id. at 366–67.
187. Id. at 368.
188. See Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nación, 194 F.R.D. 116, 119–20 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
189. See, e.g., Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 659 (“[F]ull repayment has remained the
exception, and many holdouts have received nothing.”).
190. Gulati & Klee, supra note 164, at 635–38.
191. Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 657–58.
192. Shane Romig, Argentine Navy Ship Remains Impounded in Ghana,
WALL ST. J. (Oct.
11,
2012,
8:42
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10000872396390443749204578051231734377620; see also supra Part I.C.4.
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the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ordered Ghana to release
Argentina’s frigate.193 The incident caused a significant international
controversy because the Ghanaian ruling, even if temporary, effectively
allowed a U.S. hedge fund to interfere with the most fundamental of
sovereign powers—the operation of a military vessel consistent with wellestablished international law.194
Argentina’s 2001 default has resulted in extensive litigation in addition to
the dispute with NML Capital. Besides a large number of suits filed in
Argentine courts, by 2005 almost 140 lawsuits had been filed against
Argentina in New York, Italy, and Germany.195 Many of the creditor
plaintiffs in these suits successfully obtained judgments, including a $725
million judgment in favor of EM Ltd., a fund controlled by the Dart
family.196 The legal battle for enforcement of these judgments is still
playing out at the time of this writing.197
Holdout creditors like Elliott and the Darts have been subject to
widespread criticism.
They have been charged with delaying the
restructuring process, thereby imposing unnecessary burdens on the citizens
of the sovereign debtors, and they have been denounced for seeking
payments for themselves at the expense of other creditors and at the risk of
jeopardizing the restructuring.198 The often-cited Peru-Elliott example is
illustrative of the inequities that can arise from successful holdout litigation
at the expense of creditors that have consented to restructuring. The
perception of unfairness results when a holdout creditor recovers an amount
exponentially greater than the recovery in voluntary restructuring realized
by pari passu creditors199 and the price such holdout creditor paid to
purchase the debt instrument on a secondary market.200
193. The “ARA Libertad” Case (Argentina v. Ghana), Case. No. 20, Order of Dec. 15,
2012, ¶ 108, http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20_Order_
15.12.2012.corr.pdf.
194. See, e.g., Argentine Navy Chief Replaced Amid Libertad Row, BBC NEWS (Oct. 15,
2012, 21:01 EST), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19957762.
195. Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 658.
196. EM Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., No. 03 Civ. 2507 (TPG), 2003 WL 22454934
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2003), aff’d, 382 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 2004). Dart, through CIBC Bank as
the debt holder of record, had previously sued the Central Bank of Brazil in a high-profile
case that resulted in a settlement for $25 million in cash and $52 million in Eligible Interest
Bonds. CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman) Ltd. v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F. Supp.
1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 656.
197. See supra Part I.C.4.
198. See, e.g., Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 75, at 504 (noting that most of the
international banking community “probably regret[s] that potentially ‘maverick’ lenders can
exert a disproportionate influence on the course of events by threatening to withhold consent
to a restructuring program”); Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 143, at 259–63 (describing
criticisms of holdouts as disrupting the restructuring process); Das et al., supra note 11, at
28–29.
199. For example, creditors that participated in the Greek debt exchange suffered a 59 to
65 percent “haircut,” while the holdouts were repaid in full. Zettelmeyer et al., supra note 1,
at 516.
200. In the Peruvian example discussed above, for instance, Elliott Associates received a
reported settlement amount of $56.3 million on debt they had purchased in the secondary
market for approximately $11 million. Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 657–58. Similarly, in
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II. STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES:
AD HOC DEALS, EX ANTE CONTRACTUAL TOOLS,
AND MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS
From the perspective of debtors and creditors alike, it is uncontroversial
that predictability, consistency, and transparency are important policy
objectives for designing a framework to deal with distressed sovereign
debtors.201 But the manner of achieving such predictability, consistency,
and transparency has and continues to be vociferously debated.202 Part II of
this Note discusses several solutions, either already on the table or
advocated by experts and commentators, for handling sovereign debt crises.
These tools include ad hoc deals (currently the dominant approach),
contractual devices, national legislation, and multilateral arrangements,
including a formal sovereign bankruptcy regime.
A. Ad Hoc Deals
Sovereign debt crises are generally resolved by deals negotiated on an ad
hoc basis, which may or may not involve bailouts. A restructuring
commences with a default on debt payments or an announcement of a debt
restructuring.203 Negotiations between the defaulting sovereign and its
creditors subsequently begin.204 The primary aim of the debt renegotiations
is to agree on the terms of a debt exchange that will provide debt relief to
the sovereign, bringing the sovereign’s debt burden to a sustainable level.205
The negotiations may last for months or even years.206 During this time
period, an evaluation of the debtor’s financial situation is done and the
Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Panama, 975 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), Elliott
successfully obtained judgments for the full face value of debt it had acquired at a substantial
discount, and subsequently settled for close to the judgment amount. Panizza et al., supra
note 19, at 657. However, some observers have defended the role that vulture funds play in
the sovereign debt market. See, e.g., Fisch & Gentile, supra note 100, at 1048–51 (defending
the value of vulture creditors as providing liquidity in the secondary sovereign debt market
and emphasizing the important and legitimate role of holdout litigation as a check on
opportunistic default). See generally Broner et al., supra note 95, at 5 (summarizing recent
literature demonstrating how secondary sovereign debt markets restrict governments and
enforce debts efficiently).
201. See, e.g., ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 23.
202. See, e.g., id. at 335 (“[T]he hardware of the international financial system is in better
shape than is commonly assumed [since t]he tools needed to respond to a wide range of
crises by and large already exist, [and that i]t is the software of the international financial
system—the policies and practices that determine how the existing toolkit is used—that is in
most need of an upgrade.”); STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 267–95
(evaluating several reform proposals); Das et al., supra note 11, at 87–95 (summarizing the
debate and discussing key proposals).
203. See, e.g., Das et al., supra note 11, at 12.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Data compiled by David Benjamin and Mark Wright demonstrates that, on average,
sovereign defaults take close to eight years to resolve. David Benjamin & Mark L. J. Wright,
Recovery Before Redemption: A Theory of Delays in Sovereign Debt Renegotiations 6
(Australian Nat’l Univ. Ctr. for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, CAMA Working Paper
No. 2009-15, 2009), available at http://cbe.anu.edu.au/research/papers/camawpapers/Papers/
2009/Benjamin_Wright_152009.pdf.
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debtor country often undertakes a macroeconomic adjustment program.207
One of the first steps is the verification of total debt claims, including
evaluating the characteristics of the sovereign’s debt stock and debt-service
profile.208 The next key step is a comprehensive debt sustainability
analysis, which demonstrates the financing gap, the necessary structural
adjustments, and the magnitude of needed debt relief.209 Defaulting
sovereigns and their advisors then develop various restructuring scenarios
and prepare a final restructuring proposal.210 Once the restructuring offer is
presented to creditors, they must decide whether to accept the offer. A
successful exchange generally requires a specified minimum threshold of
creditor participation.211 Creditor coordination problems and holdout risks
This process is
are especially problematic during this period.212
subsequently repeated within a few years if the adjustment program is
flawed in design, execution, or due to exogenous factors.213 Bilateral loans
are handled separately under the Paris Club process,214 and the Bank
Advisory Committee, known as the London Club, coordinates debt owed to
commercial banks.215 Suppliers and trade creditors are also handled
separately through an ad hoc process.216
The current ad hoc regime for coordinating and resolving sovereign debt
crises is unpredictable, messy, inefficient, and it lacks legitimacy.217 Debt
workouts tend to be lengthy and have uncertain, and sometimes unfair,
outcomes.218 Because it often takes many years before a distressed
sovereign achieves any debt relief, countries are sometimes forced into
open default.219 Delayed restructurings in turn lead to the loss of value,
207. Das et al., supra note 11, at 12.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 13.
212. Id.; see also supra Part I.D.
213. See, e.g., REIFFEL, supra note 15, at 50.
214. Id. at 56–94 (providing a detailed discussion of the Paris Club).
215. See, e.g., REIFFEL, supra note 15, at 95–131 (providing a detailed discussion of the
London Club).
216. Das et al., supra note 11, at 14.
217. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 270 (noting that there is
“little doubt that debt crises are . . . a lose-lose situation: there is a ‘deadweight loss’ in the
sense that value is destroyed without an offsetting benefit”); Gelpern, supra note 32, at 1114
(addressing the illegitimacy argument in explaining that “the debt restructuring process is
captured by technocrats obsessed with efficiency, who are in turn captured by rich country
politicians and bankers, so as to ensure that the burden of adjustment falls on the poor, while
the rich are protected” and that interim financing “distribute[s] losses to those least able to
bear them”); see also Benjamin & Wright, supra note 206, at 6, 8 (finding that sovereign
defaults last for almost eight years on average, creditor losses average more than 40 percent,
longer defaults are associated with larger haircuts, and default resolution is not associated
with decreased sovereign indebtedness).
218. See, e.g., Christopher Oechsli, Procedural Guidelines for Renegotiating LDC Debts:
An Analogy to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Reform Act, 21 VA. J. INT’L. L. 305
(1981); Ugo Panizza, Do We Need a Mechanism for Solving Sovereign Debt Crises? A
Rule-Based Discussion 3 (Graduate Inst. of Int’l Dev. Studies, Working Paper No. 03/2013,
2013).
219. Sachs, International Lender of Last Resort, supra note 54, at 2.
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which hurts both creditors and debtors alike.220 Also troubling is that a
sovereign debtor’s success in securing debt relief depends greatly on
international politics, rather than primarily on financial merit.221
The consequences of the inequities and inefficiencies that accompany the
current ad hoc processes are significant since sovereign debt restructurings
often involve a large-scale redistribution of wealth within and across
societies and generations.222
When governments borrow to repay
nonsovereign debt in connection with an IMF-coordinated restructuring or
bailout, the citizens of the sovereign repay those debts through higher taxes,
and suffer from reduced spending on healthcare, education, and
infrastructure.223 Furthermore, due to lack of savings and little access to
social safety services, the poor are particularly vulnerable to the downside
of financial crises brought on by their countries’ excessive borrowing.224
B. Contractual Devices
This section discusses various contractual devices aimed at mitigating the
deadweight costs associated with sovereign debt defaults and workouts.
Part II.B.1 begins by discussing the problem of incomplete contracting.
Part II.B.2 addresses collective action clauses. Part II.B.3 then discusses
exit consents, and Part II.B.4 outlines trust structures and majority
enforcement provisions.
1. The Problem of Incomplete Contracting
In response to sovereign debt defaults, issuers and creditors have
strengthened the terms in sovereign debt contracts that support creditors’
ability to enforce their claims judicially and that better empower sovereigns
to restructure their debts.225 These seemingly contradictory approaches
220. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 10; INT’L
MONETARY FUND, supra note 104, at 20. For a fuller discussion of delayed restructuring, see
also supra Part I.B.2.
221. Sachs, International Lender of Last Resort, supra note 54, at 2. Sachs argues that the
evolution of the IMF has not kept up with the pace of changes in global financial markets.
Compared with domestic financial markets, the legal and institutional structure at the
international level is relatively “underdeveloped and poorly conceptualized,” which adds
unnecessarily to the instability of international capital markets. Id. Sachs points to the IMF’s
violation of its internal rules by granting Mexico a standby loan equal to seven times its
quota, which in turn impacts future expectations. Id. Sachs also notes that there are almost
no international standards for data disclosure, capital controls, prudential standards for
nonbank institutions, and the role of monitoring institutions (such as the IMF and rating
agencies), in spite of the importance of international capital flows, especially to emerging
countries. Id.
222. See, e.g., Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 12, at 69–70 (discussing the
intergenerational tensions created by sovereign borrowing).
223. See, e.g., Ross P. Buckley, The Rich Borrow and the Poor Repay: The Fatal Flaw in
International Finance, WORLD POL’Y J., Winter 2002/03, at 59, 61–62. The World Bank
estimated that as a result of the 1997 Asian financial crises, 30 million more people in
Indonesia earned less than $1 a day than before the crisis. Id. at 62; Crisis in Asia Spawns
Millions Of ‘Newly Poor,’ WALL ST. J., June 4, 1999, at B5A.
224. Buckley, supra note 223, at 62.
225. Choi et al., supra note 43, at 133.
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reflect efforts to solve the incomplete contracting problem,226 which
requires the balancing of several goals: “encouraging sovereigns to repay
in the good state; enabling value-increasing restructurings in bad states;
preventing debtors from seeking to exploit divisions among creditors in
order to opportunistically reduce their debt burden; and preventing debtors
from taking risks in order to externalize the cost of default on creditors.”227
According to one view, the central reason for costly debt crises is the
impossibility of writing contracts that provide the appropriate incentives for
the debtor and that efficiently share exogenous risk.228 The difficulty of
writing such contracts is largely a result of either an information gap or the
absence of institutions to enforce such contracts.229 That may be because
“some contingencies are either not observable or not verifiable [by a] court,
making it difficult if not impossible to contract directly on such
contingencies.”230
Many academics and policymakers have focused on improving contracts
ex ante.231 They have debated optimal terms and endeavored to persuade
the market to adopt them.232 But aside from the difficulties in providing for
a comprehensive contractual solution, introducing new terms creates
uncertainty costs since it is unclear how parties and courts will interpret
them.233
2. Collective Action Clauses
Collective action clauses (CACs) have garnered much attention and have
been widely adopted in sovereign bond contracts since 2003 under both
U.S. and European law.234 CACs are contract terms aimed at ameliorating
problems presented by holdout creditors and collective action difficulties by
enabling creditor majorities to bind a potential holdout minority in a debt
restructuring vote.235 Rather than having to get unanimous consent for a
change in terms, CACs enable changes to the terms of a bond issuance to be
226. Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer define the incomplete contracting problem as the
“inability to write contracts that condition on all relevant actions of the debtor.” See supra
note 6, at 271.
227. Choi et al., supra note 43, at 133.
228. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 271–72.
229. Id. at 272; Choi et al., supra note 43, at 132.
230. Choi et al., supra note 43, at 132.
231. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Drafting a Model Collective Action Clause
for Eurozone Sovereign Bonds, 6 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 317 (2011); Anna Gelpern & Mitu
Gulati, The Wonder-Clause, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 367, 370–84 (2013).
232. See, e.g., Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 231, at 320–25; Gelpern & Gulati, supra
note 231, at 368.
233. Choi et al., supra note 43, at 138.
234. See, e.g., Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 231, at 368; Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati,
Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1627, 1641–43
(2006). English law bonds have contained some form of CAC for more than a century and
most Luxembourg and Japanese law bonds also contain CACs. See, e.g., Das et al., supra
note 11, at 44.
235. See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 43, at 142–43; Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 231, at
368.
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applied to all bondholders of such issuance, provided a prespecified
majority agree to the changes.236
Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati conducted a series of interviews with
market participants and policy actors regarding CACs and found that CACs
have been adopted largely as a symbolic measure intended to preempt the
adoption of an international sovereign bankruptcy mechanism and that their
technical efficacy was unimportant.237 Indeed, several restructurings of
bonds containing CACs have taken place without actually using the CACs
available.238 For example, the Greek bonds governed by U.K. law
restructured in 2012 contained a CAC, but holdout investors successfully
purchased blocking minorities in individual bond series that could not be
offset by pro-restructuring majorities.239
Putting aside the argument that CACs are merely symbolic, another key
criticism of CACs is that they do not bind creditors of different bond issues
or other types of debt, such as syndicated bank loans.240 Argentina, for
example, had 152 bond issues outstanding at the time of its restructuring in
2005. Such a debt profile presents the obvious risk that some bond
syndicates might approve a restructuring, while others reject it.241 Thus,
while CACs may prove effective where a sovereign has only a few bond
issuances, the bond-by-bond restructuring strategy is much less effective
when a sovereign is dealing with multiple bond issuances in multiple
jurisdictions subject to multiple legal regimes with differing maturities and
payout terms. Furthermore, CACs cannot bind creditors that have already
received a judgment prior to the decision to restructure by a qualified
majority of creditors. Additionally, as was the case with Greece, if the
outstanding amount of a bond issue is small, a prospective holdout creditor
can, with a relatively modest investment, own a sufficient percentage of the
issue making it impossible for the CAC ever to be used to cram down a
change to payment terms on that creditor.242 Finally, CACs do nothing to
mitigate the tendency for sovereigns to overborrow and to delay initiating a
restructuring,243 they do not necessarily decrease the amount of time a

236. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 175, at 1324–30.
237. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 231, at 368; see also Michael Bradley, James D. Cox
& Mitu Gulati, The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their Antidotes: Lessons from the
Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J. L. STUD. 289, 320–21 (2010) (“[T]he market appears to attach
little positive value to the use of CACs.”).
238. Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Foreword: Of Lawyers, Leaders, and Returning
Riddles in Sovereign Debt, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., at i, viii (2010). In fact, according
to Gelpern and Gulati, CACs have only been used once, in 2007, to restructure New Yorklaw bonds issued by Belize, which “was not a high-stakes battleground for burden-sharing
between taxpayers and private creditors, unlike the half-dozen CAC-less restructurings that
came before.” Id. at ix.
239. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 26.
240. See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 43, at 142.
241. See, e.g., Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 231, at 318.
242. Id.; see also supra note 239 and accompanying text.
243. See supra Part I.B.1–2.
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restructuring might take,244 nor make the restructuring process more
transparent and fair.
Some CAC proponents have advocated for, and some sovereign bonds
have adopted, an “aggregation feature” that allows changes at the individual
bond level to be decided with a lower majority of creditors if enough
investors across all bond issues vote for a restructuring.245 While such an
aggregation feature may prove more effective than traditional CACs, a debt
restructuring still must be voted on bond by bond, and the aggregation
feature does nothing to help restructure a sovereign’s nonbond debt, and it
does not deal with broader information-sharing problems. Furthermore,
aggregation clauses have not yet been utilized in any sovereign debt
workouts.246
3. Exit Consents
Another contractual tool—exit consents—involves allowing the majority
creditors to use the amendment clauses in their existing bonds to change
certain nonpayment terms contained in those bonds (such as financial
covenants or waivers of sovereign immunity) in order to encourage
prospective holdouts to participate in a bond exchange.247 A holdout
bondholder would retain the original bond with the original payment terms,
but because that bond would have been amended to remove key protective
covenants, the value of the bond would be reduced and enforcement would
be limited.248 This technique is referred to as an “exit” consent because the
sovereign issuer solicits the consent of its creditors to amend the old bonds
as those lenders exchange their bonds for the sovereign’s new debt
instruments.249 To effectively discourage holdouts, exit amendments must
impair the secondary market value of the old bonds following the exchange,
reduce the likelihood of eventual repayment, or make it harder for a holdout
creditor to pursue legal remedies against the issuer.250
Exit consents have survived legal challenges in the corporate bond
context.251 The leading case is Katz v. Oak Industries Inc.,252 where a
244. See Das et al., supra note 11, at 37, 45 (noting that some of the bonds exchanged by
Dominica in 2004 and Argentina in 2005 contained CACs, but the Dominica restructuring
took fifteen months to negotiate and the Argentine 2005 restructuring took more than two
years to complete; furthermore, the CACs did not prevent a serious holdout problem
following the restructurings).
245. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 231, at 319–22. The new European Stability
Mechanism (ESM), see infra Part II.D.2, requires the inclusion of CACs in all new Eurozone
bonds of more than a year’s maturity issued after January 1, 2013. Treaty Establishing the
European Stability Mechanism art. 12, para. 3, Feb. 2, 2012, http://www.europeancouncil.europa.eu/media/582311/05-tesm2.en12.pdf.
246. See Das et al., supra note 11, at 48.
247. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & C. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond
Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59, 65–68 (2000); Das et al., supra note 11, at 46–47.
248. See, e.g., Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 247, at 65–68; Das et al., supra note 11, at
46.
249. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 247, at 65–66.
250. Id. at 69.
251. Id. at 70.
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bondholder sought to enjoin an exchange offer that included exit
amendments that would remove all financial covenants binding the issuer,
on the grounds that it was “coercive” and violated the issuer’s obligation to
act in good faith with respect to its bondholders.253 The Delaware Court of
Chancery, however, rejected this argument, reasoning that a corporation
does not owe its debtholders fiduciary duties and that the exchange offer
was not so impermissibly coercive as to constitute a breach of an express
contractual duty or the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.254
But in a subsequent case, Federated Strategic Income Fund v. Mechala
Group Jamaica Ltd.,255 a court found that an exit consent went too far. In
that case, the debtor corporation sought the consent of bondholders to move
the corporation’s assets to another entity (not an obligor of the bonds) and
to eliminate certain guarantees for the bonds.256 After the debt exchange,
any remaining bondholders would only have recourse against a borrower
without assets.257 Judge Harold Baer of the Southern District of New York
held that the objecting bondholders made a sufficient showing that the offer
and proposed amendments constituted an impairment of the right to sue for
payment in violation of the indentures and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,
since the offer did not require the unanimous consent of all affected
noteholders.258
More recently, in Assénagon Asset Management S.A. v. Irish Bank
Resolution Corp.,259 a U.K. court found the use of an exit consent in an
Irish bank’s restructuring as unduly oppressive and ruled in favor of the
minority bondholder challenging the exchange.260 Holders of Anglo-Irish
bank bonds, issued pursuant to a trust deed governed by English law, had
been invited to exchange their holdings for new bonds at twenty cents on
the euro.261 At the same time, holders were asked to vote for a resolution
amending the terms of the existing bonds so as to give the issuer the right to
redeem nonparticipating bonds at €0.01 per €1,000, effectively destroying
their value.262 In rejecting the validity of the exit consent, the court
concluded that the “only function [of the exit consent] is the intimidation of
a potential minority, based upon the fear of any individual member of the
class that, by rejecting the exchange and voting against the resolution, he
(or it) will be left out in the cold.”263
However, exit consents have been successfully deployed in the context of
sovereign debt restructurings.
In 2000, the Republic of Ecuador
252. 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
253. Id. at 877–78.
254. Id. at 880–82.
255. No. 99 CIV 10517 (HB), 1999 WL 993648 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 1999).
256. Id. at *3–4.
257. See id. at *4.
258. Id. at *7.
259. [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090 (Eng.). Irish Bank Resolution Corp. was formerly known
as Anglo-Irish Bank Corp. Id. [6].
260. Id. [84]–[87].
261. Id. [30].
262. See id.
263. Id. [84].

2014]

SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY

2505

accomplished a successful exchange of its existing Brady bonds and
Eurobonds with a participation rate of approximately 98 percent.264 The
transaction resulted in a reduction in the face value of Ecuador’s debt stock
of 40 percent and involved haircuts ranging from 19 to 47 percent.265 The
high rate of participation in the exchange was likely due to a number of exit
amendments to the old bonds, including removal of the covenant to
maintain the listing of the defaulted instruments on the Luxembourg Stock
Exchange, the cross-default clause, and the negative pledge clause
restricting the issuance of collateralized debt.266
Despite the successful use of exit consents in exchange offers by Ecuador
and other countries,267 this approach will likely not be viable in all
circumstances.268 In many instances, “[t]he magnitude of the changes to
the payment terms of the original bonds, particularly the reduction in the
total principal amount of the bonds, necessary to relieve the sovereign
debtor’s financial crisis may be so great as to prohibit an exchange from
being economically feasible.”269 Additionally, a court may refuse to
enforce an exit consent against holdouts, as was the case in Federated
Strategic Income Fund and Assénagon.270 Further, some commentators
argue that in some cases, the “buoying-up effect” of the restructuring may
overcome the negative effects of the exit consents.271 When an exit consent
is employed, a holding out bondholder retains the original bonds with the
original payment terms but without the protective covenants, and by design
the value of the original bond is subsequently reduced.272 Upon completion
of the restructuring, however, the sovereign debtor’s total debt burden is
reduced and the value of the bonds is thereby increased.273 This increase in
value, the so-called “buoying-up” effect, may be greater than the decrease
in value caused by the exit consents, rendering the exit consents
ineffective.274

264. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 157–60; Buchheit &
Gulati, supra 247, at 83–84.
265. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 159–60; Buchheit &
Gulati, supra note 247, at 84.
266. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 160; Buchheit & Gulati, supra
note 247, at 84.
267. Pakistan and Uruguay have also used exit consents to successfully restructure their
bonds. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 141–43, 218; Fisch &
Gentile, supra note 100, at 1092. More recently, bond restructurings of Dominica (2004),
the Dominican Republic (2005), Argentina (2005), and Belize (2007) amended some
nonpayment terms. See Das et al., supra note 11, at 47.
268. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 100, at 1092.
269. Id.
270. See supra notes 255–63 and accompanying text.
271. See, e.g., Fisch & Gentile, supra note 100, at 1092.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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4. Trust Structure and Majority Enforcement Provisions
Most sovereign bonds issued in the United States are issued pursuant to a
fiscal agency agreement that governs the relationship between the sovereign
debtor and the fiscal agent, which is typically the investment bank serving
as lead underwriter for the bond offering.275 Under a fiscal agency
agreement, bondholders usually have the power to act individually in the
event of a default on the bonds, including acceleration of the principal
amount and suing to enforce the agreement.276 Jill Fisch and Caroline
Gentile have suggested limiting disruptive holdout litigation by eliminating
the right of individual bondholders to accelerate the principal amounts of
their bonds in the event of a default.277 Instead, each bondholder might be
limited to the right to sue the sovereign debtor only for unpaid interest and
principal. This change “would reduce the attractiveness of holdout
litigation by sharply limiting the size of the judgment potentially available
to a bondholder while simultaneously increasing the expense of pursuing
the claim.”278 Such an arrangement would more closely resemble a trust
indenture or trust deed, commonly used in the United Kingdom, under
which the trustee, as agent for the bondholders, possesses the right to
accelerate the principal amount of all the bonds and to sue the debtor for the
total amount.279 Additionally, Fisch and Gentile suggest that bondholders’
unilateral power might be limited by contractually requiring the affirmative
vote of a specified percentage of the outstanding bonds to commence any
litigation against the debtor.280 A sharing clause could further discourage
litigation by requiring that any amounts recovered via litigation must be
shared with all bondholders on a pro rata basis.281 In a similar vein, a
recent Note has advocated for the application of a “supertrustee” structure,
which has been proposed in the corporate bond context,282 for sovereign
bonds.283
As with other contractual tools, holdout litigation may be successfully
deterred by using some form of trust structure combined with a majority
enforcement provision and a sharing clause.284 But larger problems of
275. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 175, at 1332; Fisch & Gentile, supra note 100, at
1102.
276. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 100, at 1102–03.
277. Id. at 1103.
278. Id.
279. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 175, at 1331.
280. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 100, at 1104; see also Rory Macmillan, Towards a
Sovereign Debt Work-Out System, 16 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 57, 103–04 (1995) (discussing
a similar proposal).
281. Das et al., supra note 11, at 43–44.
282. See Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade & Marcel Kahan, A New Governance
Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 450–51 (1999).
283. Robert Auray, Note, In Bonds We Trustee: A New Contractual Mechanism To
Improve Sovereign Bond Restructurings, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 899, 931–35 (2013)
(suggesting that in addition to negotiating any restructuring and enforcing bond covenants,
the “supertrustee would be charged with actively monitoring the debtor country . . . . [which]
would address the current widespread lack of creditor monitoring”).
284. See Das et al., supra note 11, at 43–44.
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overborrowing and restructuring too little and too late would remain. And
it is not clear that these kinds of contractual tools would make the
restructuring process any more efficient, orderly, or transparent.
C. National Legislation
Multilateral efforts to remedy problems presented by holdout litigation
have been stalled, and contractual devices are of limited efficacy at best and
require significant lead time (since outstanding bonds cannot be amended to
contain novel contractual provisions). This has led to demands for statutory
reform at the national level. Part II.C.1 outlines statutory proposals in
Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States aimed at limiting
recovery via holdout litigation against the world’s poorest countries. Part
II.C.2 discusses a statutory proposal designed to respond to the Second
Circuit’s decision in NML Capital.285
1. Caps on Recovery Against Highly Indebted Poor Countries
Antivulture fund laws, aimed at preventing holdouts from initiating legal
action for recovery of debts from poor countries, have been introduced or
enacted in countries where key international financial markets are centered,
including Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The thrust
of these laws is limited and, in their current forms, do not provide a
comprehensive solution for problems associated with sovereign debt
restructurings. Even if these laws became more expansive in their
coverage, all countries where major international financial centers are
located would need to enact substantially similar legislation.
a. Belgium
In 2008, the Belgian senate unanimously approved a law designed to
safeguard development cooperation funds from actions taken by vulture
funds.286 The Belgian law inserts clauses into future bilateral agreements
that prevent vulture funds from seizing Belgian aid that is set aside for
specific projects.287 Because the Belgian law only covers bilateral loan
agreements and does not touch other types of debt instruments, such as
bond contracts, its present scope is particularly narrow.
b. The United Kingdom
The Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act was enacted in the United
Kingdom in 2010, and, in 2011, the U.K. Treasury ordered it permanent.288
The law is designed to curb vulture creditor activity by limiting the
285. See supra Part I.C.4.
286. GAIL HURLEY, EUROPEAN NETWORK ON DEBT & DEV., TAMING THE VULTURES: ARE
NEW MEASURES ENOUGH TO PROTECT DEBT RELIEF GAINS? 10 (2008).
287. Nancy Dubosse, IFIs Foot Dragging on Key Debt Issues, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT
(Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-561011.
288. The Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act, 2010, c. 22 (U.K.).
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recovery available on the historically incurred debt of the 40 countries
qualifying for the World Bank and IMF’s Highly Indebted Poor Countries
Initiative (HIPC).289 The Act only applies to qualifying debt incurred
before June 8, 2010.290 Although the U.K. law covers more debt
instruments than its Belgian counterpart, it is only applicable to HIPCs.
That means that the law does not cover an upper-middle-income country
such as Argentina,291 still battling vulture funds that are trying to recover on
debt incurred before June 8, 2010. Furthermore, the U.K. law does not
limit recovery on debt incurred after June 8, 2010.
c. The United States
Congress has considered legislation to limit vulture fund recovery in the
United States, but it failed to make it out of committee.292 A proposed bill
would have prevented any private creditor holding defaulted sovereign debt,
issued by a qualified poor country, from using litigation in a U.S. court to
achieve payment of more than the total amount paid for the credit plus 6
percent interest from the date the debt was acquired.293 Similar to its U.K.
law counterpart, if passed, this legislation would only offer protection to a
select group of poor countries.
2. Legislative Countermeasure to NML Capital
A recent Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform
(CIEPR) paper has proposed the adoption of legislation that immunizes
payment and clearing systems in large financial centers from attachment or
being otherwise blocked judicially.294 To be effective, substantially similar
legislation must be adopted in the key financial centers where sovereign
bonds are issued and traded.295 Such a limited reform may provide a
solution to the problem of holdout creditors bolstered by the NML Capital
decision,296 but it would only restore the status quo that existed prior to
NML Capital.297 It would do nothing to address broader problems of
overborrowing and restructuring too little and too late.298 And it would do
nothing to make the restructuring process faster, more transparent, or more
legitimate.
289. Press Release, Her Majesty’s Treasury, Government Acts To Halt Profiteering on
Third World Debt Within the UK (May 16, 2011), available at https://www.gov.uk/
government/news/government-acts-to-halt-profiteering-on-third-world-debt-within-the-uk.
290. The Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act §§ 9–10.
291. Country and Lending Groups, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/about/
country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups#Upper_middle_income (last visited Mar.
25, 2014).
292. Stop VULTURE Funds Act, H.R. 2932, 111th Cong. (2009).
293. Id. § 3(4); see also HR 2932 Legislative Leave Behind Packet, JUBILEE,
http://www.jubileeusa.org/vulturefunds/leavebehindpacket.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
294. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 31–32.
295. Id. at 31–32.
296. See supra Part I.C.4.
297. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 31–32.
298. Id. at 32.
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D. Multilateral Arrangements
This section examines multilateral arrangements for coordinating
sovereign debt crises. Part II.D.1 discusses proposals for a sovereign
bankruptcy regime, including the proposals’ theoretical underpinnings, and
Part II.D.2 briefly addresses the European Stability Mechanism.
1. Sovereign Bankruptcy
Modern proposals for a formal bankruptcy framework for sovereign
debtors have been debated since at least the early 1980s.299 The most
widely discussed bankruptcy proposal is the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism (SDRM) proposed by Anne Krueger of the IMF beginning in
2001.300 Following the sovereign debt crises in the Eurozone and the NML
Capital saga, the debate regarding sovereign bankruptcy has recently
This section proceeds by first discussing
resumed in earnest.301
fundamental bankruptcy principles. Next, it discusses the IMF’s SDRM
and some of the debate that followed. The section concludes by outlining
other proposals for sovereign bankruptcy.
a. Fundamental Bankruptcy Principles
Insolvency presents a classic “common pool” or “prisoner’s dilemma”
problem.302 Judge Richard Posner has explained that the reason for having
involuntary as well as voluntary bankruptcy is to solve a transaction-cost
problem that is created when there is a major default and many creditors.303
When there are many creditors with conflicting claims, normal market
mechanisms supported by normal contract enforcement in the courts, are
unlikely to be efficient.304
299. See Das et al., supra note 11, at 88–92 (discussing various proposals for a sovereign
bankruptcy regime); Oechsli, supra note 218; Rogoff & Zettelmeyer, supra note 25; see also
supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
300. See, e.g., Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund,
International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt
Restructuring (Nov. 26, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/
2001/112601.htm; ANNE O. KRUEGER, INT’L MONETARY FUND, A NEW APPROACH TO
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING (2002); INT’L MONETARY FUND, PROPOSED FEATURES OF A
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM (2003), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/021203.pdf [hereinafter INT’L MONETARY FUND, SDRM
PROPOSED FEATURES].
301. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 32–42;
Gelpern, supra note 32; Panizza, supra note 218.
302. JACKSON, supra note 31, at 8–18; see also supra Part I.D.
303. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 14.5–.6 (1986).
304. Sachs, International Lender of Last Resort, supra note 54, at 7. Sachs further
explains:
Consider the case of a corporation with many creditors which should be
reorganized rather than liquidated. Under normal contract law, each creditor is
allowed to press its claim as soon as the enterprise fails to service the debts as they
come due. The creditors have an interest not only in staking a claim against the
enterprise, but in doing so ahead of the other creditors. This poses an enormous
collective action problem for the creditors, in which all may lose.
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Bankruptcy law exists to further “collectivization” goals—to give debtors
a financial fresh start when warranted and to ensure that creditors do not
worsen an already bad situation (insolvency) by engaging in a destructive
race to the debtor’s assets.305 Bankruptcy regimes, as they have been
formed in domestic legal systems, address the common pool problem by
encompassing three central objectives: (i) avoidance of a “run” on assets
and holdout litigation; (ii) assurance of the payment of claims according to
priority; and (iii) provision for the cancellation of unpaid claims following
bankruptcy.306 The central goal of bankruptcy law is to maximize the
efficiency of the conversion and restructuring process in order to inflict as
little damage upon creditors as possible.307 In many cases, no outstanding
debt is actually canceled.308
Sovereign bankruptcy proposals are grounded in these fundamental
bankruptcy law principles and are premised on the notion that the
deadweight costs of sovereign debt crises are significantly related to
coordination failures and free riding. Coordination failures may delay and
make it more difficult to resolve inevitable restructurings. Timely and
comprehensive restructurings may be obstructed by holdout litigation.
Thus, proposals for sovereign bankruptcy procedures have focused on
mechanisms that make a restructuring legally binding on holdouts and
shield debtors from litigation while negotiations are ongoing.
b. Lessons from Municipal Bankruptcy in the United States
Application of bankruptcy law principles to sovereigns is not
unprecedented. Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code extends the
mechanism for corporate reorganization to municipalities.309 The three
basic principles of Chapter 11 are included: (1) the automatic stay,310 (2)
debtor-in-possession financing,311 and (3) the possibility of confirmation of
the reorganization plan by cramdown.312 But in Chapter 9, the Bankruptcy
Code expressly recognizes that governments carry out political functions
that financial distress should not impair.313 In particular, under 11 U.S.C.
§ 904, courts may not interfere with: (1) any of the political or
governmental powers of the debtor; (2) any of the property or revenues of
Id.
305. JACKSON, supra note 31, at 8–18.
306. Patrick Bolton, Toward a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring:
Lessons from Corporate Bankruptcy Practice Around the World, 50 IMF STAFF PAPERS 43–
45 (2003).
307. Charles Seavey, Note, The Anomalous Lack of an International Bankruptcy Court,
24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 499, 502 (2006).
308. Id.
309. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–946 (2012).
310. Id. § 922.
311. Id. § 364; FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(c).
312. 11 U.S.C. §§ 943–944.
313. Sachs, International Lender of Last Resort, supra note 54, at 8–9; see also Sachs,
Roadblock, supra note 54, at 75 (“The goal [of Chapter 9] is to preserve the functioning and
the autonomy of the municipality due to the vital public services that it renders.”).
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the debtor; or (3) the debtor’s use or enjoyment of any income-producing
property. According to Sachs, this provision indicates:
The fact that the debtor is a government is not seen as a reason to forgo
the relief of the bankruptcy law, but on the contrary, as a reason to
strengthen the relief in order to maintain the political functions of the
government, and to prevent the descent into the Hobbesian world, brought
on by the financial weakness of the state.314

c. IMF’s SDRM Proposal
The IMF’s proposed SDRM was aimed at providing a framework that
reinforced incentives for a sovereign with unsustainable debt and its
creditors to reach a swift and collaborative restructuring agreement in a way
that preserves the economic value of assets and facilitates a return to
medium-term sustainability.315 In recognition of the importance of
sovereignty principles, the SDRM would have been activated by the debtor
country.316 A key element of the SDRM was the “cram down” feature that
would provide for a majority vote among creditors on a restructuring plan
that would have bound a dissenting minority.317 But the IMF’s proposal
did not provide for an automatic stay on litigation or an automatic cessation
of payments, since the IMF staff took the position that in some instances it
would not be necessary for a sovereign debtor to interrupt payments and
because imposing a mandatory cessation on payments and a stay on
litigation would incentivize creditors “to rush for the exit” when activation
of the SDRM appeared imminent.318 Instead, a stay and cessation of
payments would have been permitted if approved by 75 percent of
outstanding creditors.319
Under the IMF’s proposal, the Fund’s Executive Board would have made
determinations about debt sustainability, but a dedicated Dispute Resolution
Forum would have resolved other disputes.320 The IMF’s proposal
provided incentives to induce interim financing by providing that new
financing could be excluded from the restructuring if the extension of such
financing was approved by 75 percent of outstanding creditors.321 The
SDRM incorporated the Hotchpot rule—a principle in international
solvency law that requires that any payment or asset collected by a creditor
plaintiff through litigation must be offset against the plaintiff’s claim in the
restructuring agreement.322 Notably, the IMF’s proposal provided for
coordinating official bilateral debt and private debt either outside the

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Sachs, International Lender of Last Resort, supra note 54, at 9.
INT’L MONETARY FUND, SDRM PROPOSED FEATURES, supra note 300, at 2.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 10, 25.
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SDRM or as a separate creditor class.323 The proposal also contemplated
imposing sanctions on debtor countries attempting to misuse the SDRM.324
Finally, the IMF’s proposal included many technical provisions dealing
with notification of creditors and registration and verification of claims.325
Implementation of the SDRM would have required an amendment to the
IMF Articles of Agreement, which requires approval by three-fifths of the
member countries having 85 percent of the votes.326 Because the United
States has more than 15 percent of the votes, it has a functional veto.327
Thus, as a practical matter, any initiative that necessitates an amendment to
the IMF Articles of Agreement must garner the support of the United States
in order to be implemented.
d. Reception of the IMF’s SDRM Proposal
In 2003, more than 70 percent of IMF member states supported the
SDRM proposal,328 but some industrial countries and financial markets
strongly opposed it.329 For the United States, a key concern was that the
SDRM’s provisions would interfere with the contractual claims of U.S.
investors.330 Another concern was that the jurisdiction of the proposed
dispute resolution body, although limited, would have superseded that of
U.S. courts during the restructuring process.331
The private sector consistently warned that the SDRM, if adopted, would
adversely affect the volume and price of capital to emerging market
countries.332 Many market participants, including the banks that underwrite
sovereign bonds, argued that the SDRM would have made it too easy for
sovereigns to default.333 Emerging market sovereigns similarly objected,
reasoning that if restructuring became easier, credit would become more
expensive.334 Patrick Bolton and David Skeel argued that the evidence
suggested these concerns were overstated, since countries are reluctant to
default on their debt and, due to reputational concerns, do so only as a last
323. Id. at 4.
324. Id. at 27.
325. Id. at 23–29.
326. Id. at 17; see also Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art.
XXVIII, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (as amended effective Mar. 3, 2011),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf.
327. See IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, INT’L
MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx (last updated
Mar. 11, 2014).
328. Ed Bartholomew et al., Two-Step Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Market-Based
Approach in a World Without International Bankruptcy Law, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 859, 859
(2004).
329. See, e.g., Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework To Restructure Sovereign
Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 299, 391 (2005) (discussing opposition in the United States).
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. See id.
333. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a
Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763, 764–65 (2004).
334. Scott, supra 87, at 125.
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resort.335 Furthermore, empirical evidence indicates there is a significant
overborrowing problem on the part of many sovereigns, which suggests that
tighter borrowing constraints, in the form of more expensive capital, would
actually improve welfare.336
Another central criticism of the design of the SDRM was the IMF’s
role.337 Under the SDRM, the IMF would have continued to lend to crisisafflicted countries, it would have determined debt sustainability for
purposes of approving a restructuring plan, and it would have housed the
tribunal for adjudicating disputes.338 But as a major “priority” lender, the
IMF may have had a conflict of interest in assuring its own debt was
repaid.339 Fairness under the IMF’s SDRM was a major concern since
official bilateral lending would either have been negotiated outside of the
SDRM or as a separate creditor class.340 Furthermore, the major creditor
country members dominate the IMF and its decisionmaking, and as such,
the Fund is not an impartial institution.341 Amid controversy and criticism
and without the support of the United States, the IMF’s SDRM was never
implemented.
e. Sovereign Bankruptcy Back on the Table?:
Sovereign Debt Adjustment Program
Recently, a group of sovereign debt experts have advocated for the
formation of what they call a Sovereign Debt Adjustment Program (SDAP)
based within the IMF.342 The SDAP is premised on the idea that
governments should be discouraged from delaying necessary restructurings
by relying on borrowing from official lenders, and that this can be
accomplished by making the restructuring process less risky and more
predictable.343 Its proponents argue that the only “practical” way of
achieving that is through a modification to the way in which the IMF assists
countries with unsustainable levels of debt.344 The CIEPR proposal
advocates for the establishment of what they call a Sovereign Debt
335. Bolton & Skeel, supra note 333, at 766; see also supra Part I.A.2.
336. See supra Part I.B.1.
337. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 87, at 133; Panizza, supra note 218, at 16–17.
338. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, SDRM PROPOSED FEATURES, supra note 300, at 26, 28.
339. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 87, at 126; Panizza, supra note 218, at 16–17 (“Being a
creditor itself, the Fund is unlikely to be perceived as an impartial arbiter in a debt
restructuring exercise.”).
340. Scott, supra 87, at 126.
341. See, e.g., Kapur, supra note 53, at 125–28 (discussing the lack of financial and
political risks experienced by the IMF in connection with its lending programs); Scott, supra
87, at 126; see also ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 375 (“The IMF sometimes may get
too close to some of its members and it has an institutional bias as a credit cooperative
against pushing one of its members to do something that it does not want to do. The G-7
countries, both individually and collectively, like to be seen as trying to help rather than hurt
major emerging economies and geostrategic friends and allies: The biases of the IMF’s
largest shareholders may also be reflected in IMF lending decisions.”).
342. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 32–35.
343. Id.
344. Id.
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Adjustment Facility (SDAF) that would be dedicated to assisting high-debt
countries.345
Meeting the SDAF criteria would trigger a two-step procedure.346 In the
first step, a debtor country could request a traditional adjustment program,
and if certain country-specific criteria were met, the IMF would be
prohibited from lending further unless the country’s debt also underwent a
restructuring.347 The second step would be the debt restructuring.348 The
key difference between this proposed process and the status quo is that,
under its current rules, the Fund has broad leeway to adjust conditionality
and continue lending even after programs go off track.349 Under an SDAF,
this leeway would be restricted to support programs only if they include a
restructuring of the distressed sovereign’s existing debt.350
The SDAF would commence with a request from a debtor country.351
Upon accepting the request, the IMF would prepare a draft Debt
Sustainability Analysis (DSA).352 The DSA would be based on principles
of equitable burden sharing across all creditor classes, except for
multilateral lending institutions, trade and supplier creditors, and similar
commonly recognized exceptions.353 The DSA would be disclosed
publicly, discussed with the debtor country, and comments would be invited
from civil society groups.354 The debtor country would then use the DSA
in negotiating with its creditor groups, and the IMF would review the
ultimate restructuring proposal.355 The final restructuring proposal would
then require the approval of holders of 75 percent of impacted debt
instruments.356
The CIEPR proposal contemplates dealing with holdouts by
“immunizing” the assets of the debtor country against attachment in all IMF
member countries by a holder of a debt instrument that was invited to
participate in a Fund-approved SDAF but declined to do so.357 This reform
would be accomplished by amending the IMF’s Articles of Agreement.358
This change would not directly impact creditor rights, but enforcement of a
judgment against a sovereign debtor would become impracticable. Thus,
under this proposal a creditor like NML Capital could still hale Argentina
into a U.S. court and obtain a judgment, but it would not be able to enforce
345. Id. Qualifying countries would be those facing a situation in which debt
sustainability cannot be achieved without substantial debt relief, and the criteria for SDAF
would be established ex ante. Id.
346. Id. at 33.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 34.
358. Id.
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such a judgment by, for example, obtaining an injunction blocking the
movement of an Argentine military vessel.359
The SDAF proposal is appealing in that it would be a less dramatic
change to the status quo than the SDRM. Implementation would be
relatively simple, particularly since it would not require the creation of a
new international organization.
But, to quote the CIEPR authors
themselves, “by requiring less, they also achieve less.”360 In particular,
basing the SDAF at the IMF would have the same institutional bias
problems as the SDRM.361
2. European Stability Mechanism
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was born out of broad
dissatisfaction with the ad hoc and inefficient management of the recent
Greek debt restructuring and the subsequent spillover effects experienced
throughout Europe.362 The ESM establishes a fund to provide conditional
financial assistance to member countries experiencing severe financing
problems.363 Gelpern has described the ESM as a “proto-bankruptcy
regime,”364 but it has also been called a “permanent bail-out fund.”365 The
ESM does nothing to address overborrowing problems—if anything it will
exasperate them since its very existence may increase moral hazard366—nor
does it address holdout problems in a comprehensive way.367 Thus, it is not
clear that the ESM provides an adequate solution for the Eurozone, much
less a model to be replicated elsewhere.
III. A FULL-FLEDGED SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY REGIME OFFERS THE
BEST POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENT TO THE STATUS QUO
For most of the nineteenth century, as Jeffrey Sachs explains, classic
bank runs occurred regularly despite the fact that Henry Thornton
recognized the fundamental solution to these runs as early as 1802,368

359. See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text.
360. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 32.
361. See supra Part II.D.1.d.
362. Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, supra note 245, art. 3.
363. Id.
364. Gelpern, supra note 32, at 1112.
365. See European Stability Mechanism: CAC Flap, ECONOMIST (Feb. 3, 2012, 7:24
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/02/european-stability-mechanism
(expressing skepticism that the ESM is up to the task of providing a lasting response to the
financial crisis and describing the ESM as “a permanent bail-out fund for the euro zone”).
366. See supra notes 47–54, 87–88 and accompanying text.
367. See supra Part I.D.2. The ESM does mandate the inclusion of CACs in all new
Eurozone bonds of more than a year’s maturity issued after January 1, 2013. See supra note
245.
368. HENRY THORNTON, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF THE PAPER
CREDIT OF GREAT BRITAIN (F.A. v. Hayek ed., A. M. Kelley 1965) (1802), noted in Thomas
M. Humphrey, Lender of Last Resort: What It Is, Whence It Came, and Why the Fed Isn’t It,
30 CATO J. 333, 334–43 (2010); Sachs, International Lender of Last Resort, supra note 54, at
4.
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which were further developed and promoted by Walter Bagehot in 1873.369
Only gradually, two primary institutions evolved in domestic economies:
(1) the role of the central bank as lender of last resort; and (2) state-run
deposit insurance.370 Both institutions required considerable time and
debate before being established and widely accepted.371 For example, in
the United States, the Federal Reserve System was not established until
1913, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was not launched until
1933.372 The utility of both institutions was extensively debated right up to
their adoption and application.373 Today, many observers consider the
adoption of federal deposit insurance to be the key tool in ending the
periodic bank panics in the United States,374 and no mainstream economist
would question the utility of a central bank.375 Sachs further explains that
the historical record clearly indicates that a variety of private market
responses to bank panics had been chronically insufficient for more than a
century in taming the sporadic outbreak of deep and costly crises.376 This
has also been the case with sovereign debt crises.377 Decades of experience
with ad hoc deals and private contractual tools in the modern era of
sovereign debt crises have established a similar record of persistent
failure.378 And as was the case with bank panics, the establishment of an
effective and comprehensive legal institution is necessary to correct these
costly market failures.
The current ad hoc regime for coordinating and resolving sovereign debt
crises is unpredictable, messy, inefficient, and it lacks legitimacy.379
Contractual devices fail to provide a comprehensive solution.380 And in the
absence of a comprehensive solution, collective action problems go
369. See generally BAGEHOT, supra note 14, noted in Humphrey, supra note 368, at 344–
53; Sachs, International Lender of Last Resort, supra note 54, at 4.
370. Sachs, International Lender of Last Resort, supra note 54, at 4.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. See, e.g., Brian F. Madigan, Dir., Div. of Monetary Affairs, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., Bagehot’s Dictum in Practice: Formulating and Implementing Policies
To Combat the Financial Crisis (Aug. 21, 2009), available at http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/
sympos/2009/papers/Madigan-2009.pdf.
376. Id. According to Sachs, “Private market innovations included: (1) temporary
suspensions of convertibility of bank deposits into legal tender, as a force majeure; and
(2) private deposit insurance schemes and bank clearinghouses, which lacked the financial
strength and credibility to withstand full-fledged bank panics.” Id.
377. See supra Parts I.B, I.D, II.A–B.
378. See supra Parts I.B, I.D, II.A–B.
379. See supra Part II.A.
380. See supra Part II.B. Furthermore, the recent CIEPR report thoughtfully notes that:
[C]ontracts as interpreted by judges have proven inadequate to mediate the tension
between the lack of enforcement and the impossibility of discharge in sovereign
debt. To the extent that contracts improve over time and leave less room for
interpretation, this problem may recede. [But] experience suggests that this is at
best an uncertain process that will take several decades—adaptation is a long and
winding road littered with institutional problems, and is not at all certain to address
interpretive shocks or result in more perfect contracts.
COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 20.
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unmitigated,381 the overborrowing problem persists,382 and the welldocumented problems of restructuring too little and too late remain.383
A. Goals of Reform
Reform should try to achieve four central goals384: (1) correct
overborrowing and mispricing of risk by providing a predictable, orderly,
and transparent regime that limits official sector participation (i.e., bailouts)
and corrects the incomplete contracting problem;385 (2) provide legitimacy
for sovereign debt restructurings where debt is unsustainable, thereby
removing incentives for sovereigns to delay restructuring;386 (3) provide an
efficient debt restructuring framework that reduces the deadweight costs
associated with debt workouts and does not leave sovereigns with too much
debt;387 and (4) overcome coordination failures and eliminate holdout
risks.388
B. An International Bankruptcy Court Is the Best Solution
These goals can best be accomplished by establishing a rules-based
sovereign bankruptcy regime through a multilateral treaty organization.
International institutions should provide public goods that are not provided
by the market. They should provide an international legal framework for
overcoming problems of market failure, analogous to domestic institutions
that provide that role within national economies. In the realm of financial
insolvency of sovereign borrowers, the existing international institutional
framework is inadequate. The creation of a new treaty-based institution
could therefore help to improve the efficiency of international capital
markets and promote global economic stability by better addressing these
sources of market failure. Both debtor and creditor countries would benefit
from the formation of a sovereign bankruptcy court or tribunal.
The international bankruptcy regime should include the traditional
features of bankruptcy law.389 These include a standstill on payments and
creditor enforcement once the mechanism has been initiated, the payment of
claims according to priority, the possibility of obtaining interim financing,
and the ability to enforce the restructuring plan by the approval of a
majority of creditors. Furthermore, in order to achieve a standstill and
enforce an effective restructuring plan, the jurisdiction of the tribunal
should apply to both domestic and foreign creditors.
381. See supra Part I.D.
382. See supra Part I.B.1.
383. See supra Part I.B.2–3; see also Sachs, International Lender of Last Resort, supra
note 54, at 8 (“Decentralized market-based behavior will not be efficient when governments
fall into financial distress.”).
384. These goals for reform have been identified elsewhere, such as in COMM. ON INT’L
ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 29.
385. See supra Part II.B.1.
386. See supra Part I.B.2.
387. See supra Part I.B.3; supra note 217.
388. See supra Part I.D.
389. See supra notes 306, 308, 310–12 and accompanying text.
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As prior experience has demonstrated, debtor and creditor countries may
continue to be wary of the establishment of an international bankruptcy
court.390 To address some of the concerns of reluctant debtor countries, the
bankruptcy treaty must provide reassurance that the participating states’
sovereignty will be preserved. Any treaty establishing an international
bankruptcy tribunal should include protections akin to those of Chapter 9 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which expressly prohibit the court from
interfering with the government’s political and economic powers.391
The key advantage of a full-fledged bankruptcy regime would be
comprehensiveness. Closely related to this would be the compulsory nature
of the process, meaning that creditors would be unable to decline
participation, and holdouts would no longer present a problem.
Furthermore, process centralization in the form of a single forum, with a
single set of rules, and claims paid out of a single set of assets, would be
advantageous, particularly for predictability and efficiency purposes.392
Finally, the greater likelihood of achieving an equitable outcome that is
viable for the medium-term would increase the legitimacy of the institution.
Because of institutional bias problems,393 a sovereign bankruptcy regime
should be established outside the IMF. Some experts argue that the IMF is
the only institution with sufficient expertise and capacity to carry out the
complex task of navigating sovereign debt crises. But who would endorse
the idea of creditor banks acting as the arbiter of collection actions in
domestic bankruptcy law?394 Could a tribunal structured this way be
expected to reach an equitable and legitimate outcome? Certainly not.
Perhaps the chief criticism to a treaty proposal is that achieving it would
be difficult, if not impossible. Implementation of a sovereign bankruptcy
treaty would require domestic legislation in most member countries.
However, simply because something would be difficult to achieve is a poor
reason for not trying to do so.
Another criticism of the formation of a sovereign bankruptcy regime is
that it may result in higher capital costs. However, this concern is
overstated. As discussed above in Parts I.B.1 and II.D.1.d, empirical
evidence suggests that many countries overborrow above a socially optimal
amount.395 Therefore, tighter borrowing constraints in the form of higher
390. See supra Part II.D.1.d.
391. See supra notes 313–14 and accompanying text. The text of 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012)
provides:
Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor consents or the plan so
provides, the court may not, by any stay, order, or decree, in the case or otherwise,
interfere with—
(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor;
(2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or
(3) the debtor’s use or enjoyment of any income-producing property.
See also BARRY EICHENGREEN & RICHARD PORTES, CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY
WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS 41 (1995).
392. See supra notes 195–97 and accompanying text.
393. See supra Part II.D.1.d.
394. See supra notes 337–41 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 92–95, 332–36 and accompanying text.
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capital costs would actually be a desirable result since it would correct this
market distortion.
C. Potential Starting Points for Treaty Negotiations
The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) dispute resolution body
regularly decides complex trade disputes through compulsory adjudications
that are largely deemed apolitical.396 Thus, the WTO could provide a
model for an international bankruptcy tribunal and, potentially, a starting
point for treaty negotiations. A significant difference between an
international bankruptcy tribunal and the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism is that the WTO adjudicates disputes between states, while a
bankruptcy tribunal would adjudicate disputes among states and private
creditors. However, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal provides a
precedent and model for an international tribunal with jurisdiction to
resolve disputes between states or between states and private creditors.397
Treaty negotiations could also be initiated by the United Nations. For
example, in May 2003, following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in
Iraq, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1483.398 Among other
things, that resolution encouraged the new government in Iraq to restructure
the debt stock it inherited from its predecessor regime, and it temporarily
immunized all petroleum assets of Iraq against “any form of attachment,
garnishment, or execution” and similarly protected the proceeds of Iraqi oil
sales.399 Resolution 1483 was enacted pursuant to Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations, and thus bound all members of the
organization. Although the scope of Resolution 1483 is significantly
narrower than the formation of a comprehensive international bankruptcy
mechanism, it provides a precedent for the United Nations using its
authority to facilitate the orderly resolution of an international sovereign
debt dilemma.400 The United Nations could certainly provide a forum and

396. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing
Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1546–47 (2006); Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain
of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 333, 365 (1999); see also Panizza, supra
note 218, at 15 (making a similar argument).
397. See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria (General Declaration), 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3 (1981); Undertakings of the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran with Respect to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 13 (1981); Declaration of the Government of
the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran (Claim Settlement Declaration), 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9 (1981); see also
EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 391, at 39; IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL,
http://www.iusct.net (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
398. S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003), available at
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1483%282003%29.
399. Id. ¶¶ 15, 22.
400. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 41, also discusses the
precedential value of Resolution 1483, but in doing so, advocates for a more limited reform
approach than that of this Note.

2520

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

jumping-off point for the formation of a formal international bankruptcy
regime.401
Alternatively, a country that has already demonstrated an interest in
taking the lead on addressing issues related to sovereign debt crises, such as
Belgium, could lead treaty negotiations.402 However, it is not clear that
Belgium, or any other country, is interested in taking on this leadership role
at this time.
CONCLUSION
This Note described sovereign debt markets, crises, and related legal
issues. It discussed various proposals for dealing with these problems in
sovereign debt markets, and concluded that a multilateral treaty-based
sovereign bankruptcy regime would provide the best solution for
coordinating sovereign debt crises. Formal sovereign bankruptcy is the
only way to fully solve the incomplete contracting problem inherent in
sovereign debt and to effectively mitigate collective action problems.
Furthermore, a well-designed comprehensive bankruptcy regime would
correct many of the distortions and failures in sovereign debt markets, such
as overborrowing, mispricing of risk, and restructuring too little and too
late. While obstacles to implementation of a sovereign bankruptcy regime,
including lack of political will, would certainly be formidable, that is not a
legitimate reason for abandoning an otherwise desirable goal.

401. The International Court of Justice, for example, was established in June 1945 by the
Charter of the United Nations and is the principal judicial body of the U.N. INT’L CT. JUST.,
http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). As of July 31,
2013, 193 sovereign states were parties to the Statute of the Court and twelve disputes
between state parties were pending. Rep. of the Int’l Court of Just., 68th Sess., Aug. 1, 2012–
July 31, 2013, U.N. Doc. A/68/4, Supp. No. 4, 10 (Aug. 1, 2013).
402. See supra Part II.C.1.a.

